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Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and
Brett Kavanaugh Clash Over Federal
Regulation and Criminal Justice
Daniel Harris
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh are turning out to be quite different from each other.
During the Court’s October 2018 term (ending in June 2019), in
cases with at least one dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and
Justice Neil Gorsuch were on opposite sides 49% of the time. In
the October 2019 term, the two Trump-appointed Justices again
disagreed in significant cases. The thesis of this Article is that
there are themes to the differences between Justice Kavanaugh
and Justice Gorsuch that can be discerned from their votes and
opinions.
The first theme relates to jurisprudential style. Justice
Gorsuch follows the tenets of legal formalism, originalism, and
textualism. He is apt to find definite, fixed rules established in the
past that he follows to their logical conclusions, regardless of
practical consequences or policy considerations. By contrast,
Justice Kavanaugh tends to be pragmatic and flexible. Less
interested in original intent or logical rigor and more deferential
to precedent and convention, he tends to balance competing
interests and strives for reasonable solutions that make common
sense in the here and now.
The second area of difference lies in the Justices’ attitudes
toward the federal government. Justice Kavanaugh has a positive
view of the federal government and federal power. He resolves
ambiguities in favor of giving federal officials reasonable
discretion to address contemporary problems and meet the needs
of society. In disputes between the federal government and
individuals, he is inclined to vote for the government. By contrast,
Justice Gorsuch has a skeptical view of the federal government.
He prefers to limit the discretion of federal officials through
formal rules that establish clear individual rights. In disputes
between individuals and the federal government, Justice Gorsuch
is more apt to side with the individual.
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The split between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch
has enormous potential ramifications because it moderates their
collective influence on the Court. In addition, the jurisprudential
conflict between the new appointees, as expressed in their
opinions, is a fascinating study in how different two Justices
appointed by the same President can be.
INTRODUCTION
Confounding expectations,1 it turns out President Trump’s
first two appointees to the Supreme Court are quite different
from each other.2 In their first term together, in cases with at
least one dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Neil
Gorsuch were on opposite sides 49% of the time,3 an unusually
high rate of disagreement for a pair of new Justices appointed by
the same President.4 In their second term together, the two
Trump-appointed Justices agreed more often, but they still
parted company several times,5 often in significant cases. For
example, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh wrote opinions
on opposite sides of the case holding that discrimination based on
sexual orientation violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.6
The splits between the two Justices did not track the
familiar right-to-left political spectrum. Both Justices were
willing to side with the Court’s Democratic appointees. For
example, in the October 2018 term, Justice Kavanaugh voted
with Obama appointee Justice Elena Kagan 70% of the time and
51% of the time in divided cases (just as often as he agreed with
Justice Gorsuch).7 For his part, in five to four cases in the
October 2018 term, Justice Gorsuch voted with Justice Ginsburg
35% of the time and with Justice Sotomayor 35% of the time.8
1 See Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and Politics of Judicial Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV.
785 (2019) (showing quantitative analysis that Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh
had very similar conservative predictive scores).
2 See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Supreme Court Term Marked by Shifting Alliances
and Surprise Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/us/supremecourt-decisions.html [http://perma.cc/7NR7-C9VS] (“[T]he two newest justices are a study in
contrasts.”).
3 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG (June
28, 2019, 5:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term2018/ [http://perma.cc/P4EH-6UMN].
4 See Robert Barnes, Trump’s Justices Aren’t Always on Same Page, WASH. POST,
June 30, 2019, at A1 (“Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have disagreed more often than any pair
of new justices chosen by the same president in decades.”).
5 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019, SCOTUSBLOG (July
10, 2020, 7:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Justiceagreement-7.10.20.pdf [http://perma.cc/7A57-GL8Y].
6 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
7 See Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, supra note 3.
8 See id.
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The thesis of this Article is that there is a pattern to the
disagreements between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch
that can be discerned from their opinions and is consistent with
their differing personal backgrounds. As discussed in detail
below, the two Justices have very different attitudes toward the
federal government and different jurisprudential philosophies.9
Discussed below is a quick preview.
Justice Kavanaugh has lived in the Washington, D.C., area
almost all of his life, the exceptions being seven years at Yale for
college and law school and a one-year judicial clerkship on the
West Coast. He has spent his career in federal service.10 After
clerking for Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, he became
a federal prosecutor in the Whitewater investigation.11 He later
served in the George W. Bush White House where he met his
wife, who was then a secretary for the President.12
Justice Kavanaugh has a positive, insider attitude toward
the federal government. He sees it as a force for good. He
approaches problems from the perspective of the establishment
in his hometown. To facilitate the beneficial use of federal power,
Justice Kavanaugh takes a flexible, pragmatic, public policy
approach to the judicial role.13 He interprets laws in a modern,
common-sense way. While cautious about change and sensitive to
conservative values, Justice Kavanaugh believes judges should,
within reasonable and limited bounds, modernize the law when
necessary to further underlying policy goals. Justice Kavanaugh
tends to resolve ambiguities in favor of giving federal officials
reasonable discretion.14 He sympathizes with those who exercise
federal authority or need the protection of federal power. He has
far less sympathy for those subject to federal power.15

9 For a short essay introducing this idea, see Daniel Harris, New Swing Votes on
U.S. Supreme Court, 114 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 258 (2020). The approach follows other
scholarship. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, Second Dimension Supreme
Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2016) (dividing the Supreme Court Justices into
pragmatic and legalistic groups); C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions Opinion Among Justices
U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–41, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 890 (1941) (finding that
Supreme Court Justices “are influenced by biases and philosophies of government, . . .
which to a large degree predetermine the position they will take on a given question.
Private attitudes, in other words, become public law.”).
10 See MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 9, 19 (2019).
11 See Matthew Nussbaum, Brett Kavanaugh: Who is He? Bio, Facts, Background and
Political Views, POLITICO (July 9, 2018, 2:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/brettkavanaugh-who-is-he-bio-facts-background-and-political-views-703346
[http://perma.cc/3TDJBDSK].
12 See id. at 18–19.
13 See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
14 See, e.g., County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1478 (2020)
(Kavanuagh, J., concurring).
15 See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019).
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Justice Gorsuch is cut from a different cloth. A native of
Colorado, his experience with the nation’s capital in his early
teens was difficult.16 In 1981, his mother (Anne Gorsuch), after a
successful career in Colorado state government,17 became
President Reagan’s first Director of the Environmental Protection
Agency.18 In that position, she clashed with the D.C.
establishment over her deregulatory efforts.19 Accused of
dismantling her agency and cited for contempt of Congress, Anne
Gorsuch was eventually forced from office.20 At his Senate
confirmation hearing in 2017, Justice Gorsuch said his mother
taught him “that headlines are fleeting—courage lasts.”21 The
subtext was that Justice Gorsuch believes in following principles
even if they lead to unpopular conclusions.
For most of his pre-judicial legal career, Justice Gorsuch
worked in the private sector.22 After a Supreme Court clerkship
for Justice Byron White and Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice
Gorsuch spent about a decade (including eight years as a
partner) as a litigator at Kellog Huber, an elite D.C. law firm
that represented private parties, often in opposition to the
federal government.23 When George W. Bush was President,
Justice Gorsuch spent a year in the Justice Department, working
mainly on national security matters,24 before his appointment to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, based in Denver,
Colorado, where he served for about a decade prior to joining the
Supreme Court.25 It is also worth noting that Justice Gorsuch
has a doctorate in moral philosophy from Oxford26 and met his
wife when he was a student there.27
See Heather Elliott, Gorsuch v. The Administrative State, 70 ALA. L. REV. 703, 711 (2019).
See NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 317 (2019).
See Biography of Anne M. Gorsuch (Burford), EPA (May 20, 1981),
http://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/biography-anne-m-gorsuch-burford.html
[http://perma.cc/3MYK-6X8B].
19 See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Neil Gorsuch’s Mother Once Ran EPA. It Didn’t go
Well, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:33 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuchs-mother-once-ran-the-epa-it-was-a-disaster/
[http://perma.cc/XN4N-C92F].
20 See Elliott, supra note 16.
21 GORSUCH, supra note 17, at 317.
22 See Elliott, supra note 16.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch for the U.S. Supreme Court, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gorsuch-trumpsupreme-court/515232/ [http://perma.cc/M8NF-DQTY].
26 See Christopher R. Green, Justice Gorsuch and Moral Reality, 70 ALA. L. REV.
635, 636 (2019).
27 Joey Bunch, Louise Gorsuch Goes Down in History, Sharing Marmalade Recipe in Supreme
Court Book, COLO. POLITICS (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/louise-gorsuchgoes-down-in-history-sharing-marmalade-recipe-in-supreme-court-book/article_c888b00d-d7245913-8dea-d21bff2da6c2.html [http://perma.cc/M8ZC-NWBQ].
16
17
18
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Justice Gorsuch has a wary, outsider attitude toward the
federal government.28 He fears its unauthorized encroachment on
democratic self-governance and the traditional common law.29 He
opposes judges or federal agencies updating the law to conform to
modern policy or popular sentiment.30 Instead, Justice Gorsuch
believes judges must follow the law as it is, not as they want it to
be.31 In his mind, this means reasoning from (his vision of) the
basic precepts of the American Republic, the common law, and
Western Civilization—such as respect for the individual and the
rule of law, as supplemented by duly enacted legal texts
construed in accordance with the interpretative tools that judges
have used for centuries.32 While this philosophy usually leads to
narrowing constructions of federal power, Justice Gorsuch will
follow his (often literalist) understanding of the written law to its
logical conclusion even if that means an expansion of federal
authority.33
To demonstrate this thesis about the differences between the
two Justices, this Article proceeds in six parts plus a conclusion.
Part I considers a case in which Justice Kavanaugh and Justice
Gorsuch wrote opposing opinions that illustrate their differing
attitudes toward the federal government and conflicting
jurisprudential approaches. Part II discusses four cases from the
October 2018 term in which Justice Kavanaugh voted with
Justice Ginsburg in support of federal regulation and Justice
Gorsuch was on the other side. Part III discusses four cases from
the October 2018 term in which Justice Gorsuch voted with
Justice Ginsburg in support of parties opposed to the federal
government and Justice Kavanaugh was on the other side. Part
IV looks at cases from the October 2018 term in which Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh were in agreement. Part V looks
at six cases from the Supreme Court’s October 2019 term in
which Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch were on opposite
sides and one or both wrote opinions. Part VI makes
generalizations comparing the pragmatic insider jurisprudence of
Justice Kavanaugh with the formalist outsider approach of
Justice Gorsuch. Part VII briefly concludes by considering what
the differences between the two Justices might mean for the
future of United States law.

28 Daniel Harris, The New Swing Votes on the U.S. Supreme Court, 114 NW. L. REV.
ONLINE 258, 260 (2020).
29 Id.
30 GORSUCH, supra note 17, at 10.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2442 (2019) (Gorsuch J., concurring).
33 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFLICT
The jurisprudential conflict between Justice Gorsuch and
Justice Kavanaugh is best illustrated by United States v. Davis, a
five-to-four decision in which the majority coalition consisted of
the Court’s four Democratic appointees plus Justice Gorsuch.34 In
Davis, the defendants “Maurice Davis and Andrew Glover
committed a string of gas station robberies in Texas.”35 They
were caught, prosecuted in federal court, and convicted of
violations of the federal Hobbs Act and conspiracy to violate the
Hobbs Act.36 Because they used a shotgun to commit their
crimes, they were also convicted of carrying or using a firearm to
violate the Hobbs Act and using or carrying a firearm in
connection with their conspiracy.37 The question before the
Supreme Court involved the validity of that last conviction.38
The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), mandated
“heightened criminal penalties” for using or carrying a firearm in
connection with a federal “crime of violence.”39 The term “crime of
violence” had alternative definitions set forth in § 924(c)(3).40
According to § 924(c)(3)(A), a crime of violence was a felony that
had “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force”
as one of its elements.41 Alternatively, § 924(c)(3)(B) defined a
“crime of violence” as a felony “that by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.”42
The defendants’ convictions for carrying or using a firearm in
connection with their Hobbs Act violations were valid under
§ 924(c)(3)(A) because the use or threatened use of force was an
element of the Hobbs Act crime.43 But § 924(c)(3)(A) did not work for
the defendants’ convictions for carrying or using a firearm in
connection with the conspiracy charge because the use or threatened
use of force was not an element of conspiracy.44 To justify those
convictions, the government needed to use § 924(c)(3)(B).45

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
Id. at 2324.
Id. at 2324–25.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2324.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2324.
Id. at 2523, 2336.
Id. at 2325.
Id. at 2327.
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That was a problem. Courts and the government construed
§ 924(c)(3)(B) to require what was called the “categorical
approach”—an inquiry into the potential for harm inherent in the
category of offense that the defendant committed (e.g., whether wire
fraud is the type of crime that has a substantial risk of harm).46 In
2018, the Supreme Court held that a virtually identical statutory
definition of “crime of violence” also mandated that same categorical
approach and it was unconstitutionally vague because it required
courts “to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in the
ordinary case, and to judge whether that abstraction presents some
not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk.”47
To get rid of the vagueness problem and thereby save the
convictions and the statute, the government asked the Supreme
Court to reinterpret § 924(c)(3)(B) so that its definition of a crime
of violence would depend on what defendants actually did and
not on the hypothetical potential for harm associated with their
category of crime.48 The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
ruled against the government.49 The five Justices in the majority
were the Court’s four Democratic appointees plus Justice
Gorsuch, who wrote the majority opinion.50
Justice Gorsuch began his opinion by making it clear that he
did not consider the statute a first draft that the Court could
rework, stating: “In our constitutional order, a vague law is no
law at all. Only the people’s elected representatives in Congress
have the power to write new federal criminal laws.”51 Justice
Gorsuch went on to explain that: “When Congress passes a vague
law, the role of courts under our Constitution is not to fashion a
new, clearer law to take its place, but to treat the law as a nullity
and invite Congress to try again.”52
Taking his task as statutory interpretation, not revision,
Justice Gorsuch said § 924(c)(3)(B) meant what it appeared to
say.53 For purposes of the section, a crime of violence was to be
determined using the categorical approach, which involved
assessing the potential for harm associated with the abstract
category of the defendant’s offense.54 Because this inquiry
provided “no reliable way to determine which offenses qualify as
See id. at 2326.
See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211, 1216 (2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
48 See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2327.
49 Id. at 2336.
50 Id. at 2323.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2323–24.
54 Id. at 2324.
46
47
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crimes of violence,” the language was “unconstitutionally
vague.”55
Justice Gorsuch explained that the government’s alternative
reading of the statute could not “be squared with the statute’s
text, context, and history.”56 Were the Supreme Court to adopt
the government’s revised version of the statute, Justice Gorsuch
said, the Supreme Court Justices would be “stepping outside
[their] role as judges and writing a new law rather than applying
the one Congress adopted.”57
Justice Gorsuch emphasized that the defendants would still
receive substantial prison time because they “did many things
that Congress had declared to be crimes” and would “face
substantial prison sentences for those offenses.”58
Justice Gorsuch also noted that the government’s new
reading of Section 924(c)(3)(B) would criminalize some conduct
that was not made criminal by the law as it was actually written
(such as a defendant’s use of a firearm in connection with an
offense that does not normally involve the use of force).59
Expanding the statute through interpretation “would risk
offending the very same due process and separation-of-powers
principles on which the vagueness doctrine itself rests.”60
Therefore, despite the general reluctance of courts to declare Acts
of Congress unconstitutional, “a court may not, in order to save
Congress the trouble of having to write a new law, construe a
criminal statute to penalize conduct it does not clearly
proscribe.”61
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the dissent, joined in whole by
Justices Thomas and Alito and in part by Chief Justice Roberts.62
The dissenting opinion, like the majority opinion, began with a
discussion of important considerations: “Crime and firearms form a
dangerous mix. From the 1960s through the 1980s, violent gun
crime was rampant in America.”63 Emphasizing the practical needs
of modern American society,64 Justice Kavanaugh noted that “The
wave of violence destroyed lives and devastated communities,
particularly in America’s cities. Between 1963 and 1968, annual
murders with firearms rose by a staggering 87 percent, and annual
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 2323–24.
Id. at 2324.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 2333.
Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2332–33.
Id. at 2333.
Id. at 2336.
Id.
Id.
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aggravated assaults with firearms increased by more than 230
percent.”65
Continuing in a pragmatic vein, Justice Kavanaugh went on
to describe how “[f]aced with an onslaught of violent gun crime
and its debilitating effects, the American people demanded
action.”66 Justice Kavanaugh explained that gun control laws,
such as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), were passed in response.67 “Over the
last 33 years, tens of thousands of § 924(c) cases have been
prosecuted in the federal courts. Meanwhile, violent crime with
firearms has decreased significantly.”68
Justice Kavanaugh then attacked as surprising and
extraordinary the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a key
provision of § 924(c)—”a federal law that has been applied so
often for so long with so little problem.”69 Justice Kavanaugh
warned that “[t]he Court’s decision . . . will make it harder to
prosecute violent gun crimes in the future.”70 Further, he stated
“[t]he Court’s decision also will likely mean that thousands of
inmates who committed violent gun crimes will be released far
earlier than Congress specified when enacting § 924(c). The
inmates who will be released . . . are offenders who committed
violent crimes with firearms, often brutally violent crimes.”71
Justice Gorsuch responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s first
argument by saying that there was nothing “surprising” or
“extraordinary” about striking down a statute when even the
government conceded the law would be unconstitutional if it
continued to mean what it had meant through thousands of
prosecutions.72 On the contrary, Justice Gorsuch said, it would be
surprising and extraordinary if the Supreme Court could save
the statute by suddenly giving it “a new meaning different from
the one it has borne for the last three decades.”73
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent argued that the most sensible
approach for a statute such as § 924(c)(3)(B) was to focus on what
the defendant had actually done and not to employ the
categorical approach of looking at the potential for harm
associated with the abstract crime.74 Justice Kavanaugh quoted a
lower court opinion: “If you were to ask John Q. Public whether a
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 2336 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2333 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2343 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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particular crime posed a substantial risk of violence, surely he
would respond, ‘Well, tell me how it went down—what
happened?’”75 The majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch responded
that the language of the statute before the Supreme Court was
not “the language posited in the dissent’s push poll. Section
924(c)(3)(B) doesn’t ask about the risk that ‘a particular crime
posed’ but about the risk that an ‘offense . . . by its nature,
involves.’”76
The dissent by Justice Kavanaugh said that it did not matter that
the government had for many years taken the position that
§ 924(c)(3)(B) mandated the (now unconstitutional) categorical
approach, noting that the government’s position came “after the courts
settled on a categorical approach—at a time when it did not matter for
constitutional vagueness purposes . . . .”77 In response, Justice Gorsuch
asked: “Isn’t it at least a little revealing that, when the government had
no motive to concoct an alternative reading, even it thought the best
reading of § 924(c)(3)(B) demanded categorical analysis?”78
The dissent by Justice Kavanaugh noted that the word
“offense” in § 924(c)(3) could be read to refer to what the
defendant had actually done,79 and that “an ambiguous statute
must
be
interpreted,
whenever
possible,
to
avoid
unconstitutionality.”80 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh said, “it is
fairly possible to interpret § 924(c)(3)(B) to focus on the
defendant’s actual conduct” and that reading would make the
statute constitutional.81
In response, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the dissent’s
new reading of the law would criminalize conduct that was not
criminal under the categorical approach—the interpretation of
the law that fit best with the statute’s language and history.82
Justice Gorsuch chided the dissent for “not even try[ing] to
explain how using the canon to criminalize conduct that isn’t
criminal under the fairest reading of a statute might be
reconciled with traditional principles of fair notice and
separation of powers.”83 Justice Gorsuch noted that “the dissent
seem[ed] willing to consign thousands of defendants to prison for
years . . . because it [was] merely possible Congress might have

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. (quoting Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2018)).
Id. at 2334 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2355 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2334 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2347–48 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2351.
Id. at 2335 (majority opinion).
Id.
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[ordained those penalties].”84 Justice Gorsuch concluded: “In our
republic, a speculative possibility that a man’s conduct violated
the law should never be enough to justify taking his liberty.”85
The last section of the dissent returned to the theme that
“[t]he Court’s decision means that people who in the future
commit violent crimes with firearms may be able to escape
conviction under § 924(c).”86 After giving an example of a horrible
crime that might go unpunished, Justice Kavanaugh argued that
“when the consequences [of a statutory interpretation] are this
bad,” the Court should “double-check” its legal analysis.87 That
double-checking, Justice Kavanaugh went on, would show that
the statute did not really compel the Court’s decision in Davis.88
Justice Kavanaugh concluded: “I am not persuaded that the
Court can blame this decision on Congress. The Court has a way
out, if it wants a way out.”89
The majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch addressed the
dissent’s public policy arguments by asking: “[W]hat’s the point
of all this talk of ‘bad’ consequences if not to suggest that judges
should be tempted into reading the law to satisfy their policy
goals?”90 Justice Gorsuch went on to note the various ways
Congress could fix the problem and then concluded: “[T]hese are
options that belong to Congress to consider; no matter how
tempting, this Court is not in the business of writing new
statutes to right every social wrong it may perceive.”91
The Davis decision illustrates the philosophical differences
between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh. Justice
Gorsuch construed the statute based on its text, history, and
prior construction. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the general
purpose of the statute, common sense, and the practical
consequences of alternative interpretations. Justice Gorsuch’s
focus was on the rights of the individual; he resolved doubts
about the meaning of the law against the government and in
favor of liberty. Justice Kavanaugh’s concern was with the
welfare of society; he resolved ambiguities in favor of the
government and against wrongdoers.
Justice Gorsuch treated the statute’s meaning as objective
and fixed; something individuals could ascertain and rely on, not
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2353 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2355.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2335 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2336.
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something government officials could manipulate based on their
notions of the best interests of society. Justice Kavanaugh saw
the law’s meaning as malleable; something the government and
the Court could and should alter in order to serve the public
interest.
II. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH WITH JUSTICE GINSBURG AGAINST
JUSTICE GORSUCH
In cases involving assertions of federal power, Justice
Kavanaugh often sided with the Court’s liberal Justices and against
Justice Gorsuch. This section provides four examples. Two of the
cases discussed below involved federal regulation of private
business, and two involved constitutional challenges to state
actions. In all four cases, Justice Kavanaugh took the side of the
parties invoking federal power while Justice Gorsuch sided with
parties resisting federal power. Justice Kavanaugh justified his
rulings with pragmatic and progressive arguments consistent with
the modern norms of Washington, D.C. Justice Gorsuch made a
variety of counterarguments in support of local self-governance and
the traditional common law.
A. Apple Inc. v. Pepper92
Apple Inc., an antitrust case, arose out of Apple’s practice of
requiring its customers to purchase applications (“app”) for Apple
devices through the Apple App Store.93 Several customers sued
Apple for allegedly using its monopoly power to charge higher
prices than Apple customers would otherwise have paid.94 The
gist of Apple’s defense was that it did not set the allegedly
unlawful prices.95 Although Apple imposed a uniform 30%
commission on the developers, Apple argued that it should not be
blamed for the prices because the developer of each app
ultimately set the price for that app.96
The company invoked a 1977 Supreme Court precedent,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,97 which held that customers who did
not purchase directly from the alleged antitrust violator did not
have standing to sue that party for damages under the federal
antitrust laws. Apple argued that the general principle of Illinois
Brick should apply because, similar to the facts in that case, the

92
93
94
95
96
97

Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
Id. at 1518–19.
See id. at 1518.
See id. at 1519.
See id. at 1519, 1521–22.
See id. at 1519; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728–29 (1977).
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consumer plaintiffs were suing a party that did not set the prices
that caused the alleged antitrust injury.98
The district court agreed with Apple and dismissed the
case.99 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
consumers had standing to sue under Illinois Brick because they
purchased their apps directly from Apple.100 The question before
the Supreme Court was whether to adopt a broad construction of
the Sherman Act and a narrow construction of the Illinois Brick
exception (as the plaintiffs wanted) or, conversely, a narrow
construction of the Sherman Act and a broad construction of the
Illinois Brick exception, as Apple urged.101
By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court sided with the
consumer plaintiffs.102 The majority consisted of the Court’s four
liberal Justices plus Justice Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority
opinion.103 The opinion twice emphasized that the Sherman Act
should be construed broadly to achieve its purpose of protecting
consumers from monopolists.104 Early on, the opinion noted: “A
claim that a monopolistic retailer (here, Apple) has used its
monopoly to overcharge consumers is a classic antitrust claim.”105
The opinion went on to say that it would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to immunize monopolistic retailers from
antitrust litigation in the scenario where the retailers have their
suppliers set the base prices.106 “We refuse to rubber-stamp such
a blatant evasion of statutory text and judicial precedent.”107
The opinion by Justice Kavanaugh brushed aside Apple’s
argument that the proper parties to bring a monopolization claim
were the suppliers who dealt directly with Apple, noting: “Leaving
consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers simply because
upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes little sense
and would directly contradict the longstanding goal of effective
private enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases.”108
Justice Kavanaugh also dismissed Apple’s argument about the
potential complexity of damage calculations, stating: “Illinois Brick
is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to play
any time that a damages calculation might be complicated.”109
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

See id.
See id.
See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 325 (9th Cir. 2017).
See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019).
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1515.
See id. at 1520, 1525.
Id. at 1519.
See id. at 1523–24.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
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In its close, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion returned to the
theme that the Sherman Act should be interpreted consistently
with its pro-consumer purposes.110 Justice Kavanaugh said: “The
plaintiffs seek to hold retailers to account if the retailers engage
in unlawful anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers who
purchase from those retailers. That is why we have antitrust
law.”111 The opinion went on to note that from the Sherman Act’s
inception “‘protecting consumers from monopoly prices’ has been
‘the central concern of antitrust.’”112
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.113 He treated Illinois
Brick as an application of the general rule that statutory causes
of action are ‘‘limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately
caused by violations of the statute.”114 Justice Gorsuch reasoned
that Illinois Brick rejected a suit by indirect purchasers because
the plaintiffs in that case were relying on pass-on theory of
damages that was inconsistent with the common law proximate
cause rule.115 Justice Gorsuch then criticized the majority for
allowing “a pass-on case” based on a formalistic and overly
narrow interpretation of Illinois Brick.116
The dissent by Justice Gorsuch also noted the practical
difficulties of adjudicating the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim: “Will
the court hear testimony to determine the market power of each
app developer, how each set its prices, and what it might have
charged consumers for apps if Apple’s commission had been
lower?”117 In addition, Justice Gorsuch criticized Justice
Kavanaugh for preferring a broad reading of the Sherman Act to
“the well-trodden path of construing the statutory text in light of
background common law principles of proximate cause.”118
For purposes of this Article, the important takeaway from
Apple Inc. is how differently Justice Kavanaugh and Justice
Gorsuch viewed federal regulation. Justice Kavanaugh favored a
liberal construction of the Sherman Act that would ensure that
all of the law’s regulatory goals could be achieved.119 Justice
Gorsuch did not worry about incomplete enforcement.120 His
See id. at 1525.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1527 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 132 (2014)).
115 See id. at 1525–26.
116 See id. at 1526.
117 Id. at 1528.
118 Id. at 1530.
119 See id. at 1525.
120 See id. at 1525–31.
110
111
112
113
114
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concern was with the law going too far, so he preferred reading
into the statute principles taken from common law traditions to
make sure the federal statute limited damages liability to private
parties that had actually caused the alleged harm.121
Justice Kavanaugh wanted to protect society from the
machinations of big companies, particularly those companies that
violate the spirit of the law in crafty ways and then seek shelter
in made-up technical defenses.122 He sympathized with those
seeking to enforce the law and with the people the statute was
intended to protect.123 He had much less concern for the supposed
rights of alleged law-breakers.124 By contrast, Justice Gorsuch
took a skeptical attitude toward law enforcement and its
tendency toward mission creep.125 His sympathies were with
those subject to federal regulation.126
B. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries127
A similar conflict between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice
Gorsuch took place in DeVries, a case involving the application of
federal maritime law to a products liability claim.128 Two sailors,
John DeVries and Kenneth McAfee, were exposed to asbestos
while serving in the U.S. Navy (DeVries in the 1950s and McAfee
in the 1980s).129 They later developed cancer, allegedly caused by
asbestos exposure.130 The former sailors did not sue the asbestos
manufacturers because those companies were in bankruptcy, and
they believed they could not sue the Navy because of a 1950
Supreme Court precedent.131 Instead, the sailors and their wives
filed suit against companies that had supplied the Navy with
products such as pumps, blowers, and turbines to which the
Navy had later added asbestos.132 The theory of liability was that
the defendant companies should have warned them about the
dangers of asbestos insulation, so that the former sailors would
have known to wear respiratory masks and avoid the hazard.133

See id. at 1530.
See id. at 1524 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1524–25.
See id.
See id. at 1525–31 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1529–30.
See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019).
Id. at 991.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 992 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) (concluding “that
the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen
where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service”).
132 See id.
133 Id.
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Do Not Delete

354

5/19/2021 1:41 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

The cases were commenced in state court and later removed
to federal court because they fell within the federal maritime
jurisdiction.134 The district court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment, relying on the traditional common law
“bare-metal” defense, under which product manufacturers have
no duty to warn about the dangers of materials that are not in
their products at the time of sale.135 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed in accordance with a modern
products liability rule that requires manufacturers to warn about
the dangers of added materials if it is foreseeable that the
materials might be added to the product after sale.136
On review, the Supreme Court rejected both the “bare-metal”
defense followed by the district court and the “foreseeable risk”
test of the Court of Appeals.137 Instead, the Court adopted a
somewhat less plaintiff-friendly, modern rule followed in some
jurisdictions under which “a product manufacturer has a duty to
warn when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated
product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the
manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will
realize that danger.”138
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s four liberal
Justices.139 Justice Kavanaugh began by emphasizing that
federal courts have great freedom to shape federal maritime law,
noting: “When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as
a federal ‘common law court,’ much as state courts do in state
common-law cases.”140 Justice Kavanaugh went on to emphasize
that in formulating maritime law, courts were not bound by what
was done in the past, but instead may consider “judicial opinions,
legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.”141
Justice Kavanaugh said that while there was a general duty
to warn about risks in one’s products, there were disagreements
among courts as to what that entailed when the risks came from
added materials.142 Some jurisdictions followed the “bare-metal”
defense under which there was no duty to warn about the risks of
materials added after sale, some jurisdictions went by the
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

See id.
See id.
See id. (citing In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 873 F.3d 232, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2017)).
See id. at 991.
Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 992 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008)).
Id.
See id. at 993.
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foreseeable risk approach, and some courts followed what Justice
Kavanaugh described as an intermediate approach.143 Justice
Kavanaugh decided that the intermediate approach would be the
best policy choice, reasoning that the foreseeability test would be
too costly and result in “overwarning” users (with an
overwhelmingly long list of potential hazards), while the
bare-metal defense would not do enough to promote safety.144
Justice Kavanaugh explained why it was a good idea for the
Supreme Court to use its discretion to shape maritime law to
provide plaintiffs with more protection than afforded by the
traditional common law, noting: “Maritime law has always
recognized a ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ of those who
undertake to ‘venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea
voyages.’”145 Justice Kavanaugh went on: “The plaintiffs in this
case are the families of veterans who served in the U.S. Navy.
Maritime law’s longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our
decision to require a warning in these circumstances.”146
Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, which was joined by
Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.147 He argued that the
traditional common law bare-metal defense was the proper rule
whereas the more modern standard adopted by the majority did
not enjoy “meaningful roots in the common law.”148 Justice
Gorsuch cited the Restatement (Third) of Torts from 1997 for the
proposition that “the supplier of a product generally must warn
about only those risks associated with the product itself, not
those associated with the ‘products and systems into which [it
later may be] integrated.’”149
Justice Gorsuch argued that “the traditional common law
rule still makes the most sense today” because “[t]he
manufacturer of a product is in the best position to understand
and warn users about its risks” and therefore should be the one
who has the duty to warn about product hazards.150 Expanding
the duty to warn was not a good idea, Justice Gorsuch explained
because “we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about
the dangers of its products when we require other people to share
the duty to warn and its corresponding costs.”151

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

See id. at 993–94.
See id. at 994–95.
Id. at 995 (quoting Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285 (1980)).
Id.
Id. at 996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See id. at 996–97.
Id. at 997.
Id.
See id. at 997–98.
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Justice Gorsuch also argued that the traditional common law
fit consumer expectations. “A home chef who buys a butcher’s
knife may expect to read warnings about the dangers of knives
but not about the dangers of undercooked meat. Likewise, a
purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings at the pump
about its flammability but not about the dangers of recklessly
driving a car.”152
Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority for replacing a clear
common law rule with an opaque standard that courts would find
hard to administer.153 Justice Gorsuch then raised a fairness
argument: “Decades ago, the bare metal defendants produced their
lawful products and provided all the warnings the law required.
Now, they are at risk of being held responsible retrospectively for
failing to warn about other people’s products.”154 He argued that
“[i]t is a duty they could not have anticipated then and one they
cannot discharge now. They can only pay. Of course, that may be
the point.”155 Justice Gorsuch then went on to argue that the
Court might be “motivated by the unfortunate facts of this
particular case, where the sailors’ widows appear to have a limited
prospect of recovery from the companies that supplied the asbestos
(they’ve gone bankrupt) and from the Navy that allegedly directed
the use of asbestos (it’s likely immune under our precedents).”156
Nevertheless, Justice Gorsuch went on, sympathy for the
plaintiffs did not justify imposing liability on innocent
manufacturers: “how were they supposed to anticipate many
decades ago the novel duty to warn placed on them today? People
should be able to find the law in the books; they should not find
the law coming upon them out of nowhere.”157
Once again, Justice Kavanaugh sympathized with those
seeking to enforce federal law, and those needing the protection
of federal law. Justice Gorsuch’s sympathies were with those who
needed protection from federal law. Justice Kavanaugh saw the
law as something flexible that judges should update for the
better protection of the people. Justice Gorsuch saw the law as
fixed; something that private parties could count on, not
something that could be changed years later so as to punish
defendants for conduct that was legal at the time it was done.
Justice Kavanaugh preferred a modern, consumer-protective
version of the common law that expanded the scope of corporate
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 998.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999–1000.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
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responsibility, although he was careful to adopt an intermediate
step and not the most plaintiff-friendly approach. Justice
Gorsuch opted for the traditional common law rule that limited
the duty to warn to the party best situated to fulfill that duty,
even though that construction of the law meant ruling against
sympathetic plaintiffs.
C. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas158
In Tennessee Wine and Spirits, a Tennessee statute required
people applying for a license to operate a retail liquor store to
have lived in the state for at least two years prior to their
application.159 Normally, laws that impose durational residency
requirements on citizens seeking state benefits are deemed
unconstitutional because they violate the free trade and free
travel principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause.160 The
question before the Supreme Court in Tennessee Wine and Spirits
was whether there was an exception to that general rule based
on Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.161 Section 2 was
enacted as part of the deal that repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment (the Prohibition Amendment) and, by its terms,
gives states the power to regulate the transportation or
importation of liquor.162
The Supreme Court struck down the state law by a vote of
seven-to-two. The majority opinion by Justice Alito followed
modern precedents to construe Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment narrowly.163 According to the majority, Section 2
authorized states to enact “alcohol-related public health and
safety measures” but was “not a license to impose all manner of
protectionist restrictions on commerce in alcoholic beverages.”164
The opinion concluded that “[b]ecause Tennessee’s 2-year
residency requirement for retail license applicants blatantly
favors the State’s residents and has little relationship to public
health and safety, it is unconstitutional.”165
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined
only by Justice Thomas. While agreeing that Section 2 did not
give states the power to violate all manner of constitutional
rights, Justice Gorsuch argued that the constitutional provision did
allow states to escape the free trade principles the Supreme Court
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
Id. at 2457.
See id.
See id. at 2459.
Id.
See id. at 2476.
Id. at 2457.
Id.
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had read into the Dormant Commerce Clause.166 Invoking history,
Justice Gorsuch said that both before the Prohibition Amendment
and after its repeal, “one thing has always held true: States may
impose residency requirements on those who seek to sell alcohol
within their borders to ensure that retailers comply with local laws
and norms.”167
The bulk of the dissent was spent debating the majority’s take
on history and modern precedents under the dormant Commerce
Clause and Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.168 But in its
closing paragraph, the dissent spoke to the philosophical issues that
prompted Justice Gorsuch to disagree with the majority of the
Court.169 The paragraph began: “As judges, we may be sorely
tempted to ‘rationalize’ the law and impose our own free-trade rules
for all goods and services in interstate commerce.”170 That
temptation should be resisted, Justice Gorsuch argued, because
“real life is not always so tidy and satisfactory, and neither are the
democratic compromises we are bound to respect as judges. Like it
or not, those who adopted the Twenty-first Amendment took the
view that reasonable people can disagree about the costs and
benefits of free trade in alcohol.”171 Justice Gorsuch went on: “Under
the terms of the compromise they hammered out, the regulation of
alcohol wasn’t left to the imagination of a committee of nine sitting
in Washington, D.C., but to the judgment of the people themselves
and their local elected representatives.”172
In a footnote, the majority opinion by Justice Alito addressed
this passage in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, characterizing it as
“empty rhetoric” and noting that even the dissent strayed “from a
blinkered reading” of Section 2 by conceding that the provision
did “not abrogate all previously adopted constitutional
provisions, just the dormant Commerce Clause.”173
The Tennessee Wine and Spirits decision illustrates key
differences between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch.
Justice Kavanaugh favors national norms over provincial
interests. Justice Gorsuch prefers to defend localities from the
(supposed) overreach of the federal government. Justice
Kavanaugh is happy to be part of the Washington, D.C.,
consensus. Justice Gorsuch will go out of his way to defy it. He is
also willing to use sweeping anti-Washington, D.C., rhetoric, even
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 2477. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 2476–84.
Id. at 2484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2468 n.15 (majority opinion).
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when the logic of that rhetoric might go further than he actually
wants to go. It is also worth noting that Justice Gorsuch is
sympathetic to state regulation of business; his anti-government
sentiment seems to be limited to the federal authorities.
D. Flowers v. Mississippi174
The defendant in Flowers, Curtis Flowers, was convicted in
Mississippi state court of murdering four people in Winona,
Mississippi, in 1996.175 It was his sixth trial for the crime.176 The
first three trials resulted in convictions that were reversed by the
Mississippi
Supreme
Court
because
of
prosecutorial
misconduct.177 The fourth and fifth trials resulted in hung
juries.178 The question before the Supreme Court was whether, in
Flowers’ sixth trial, the prosecutor improperly struck Carolyn
Wright, a black prospective juror, for racially discriminatory
reasons in violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky.179
The Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court
and ruled for the defendant by a vote of seven-to-two.180 The
majority opinion by Justice Kavanaugh concluded that “[f]our
critical facts, taken together, require reversal.”181 The first fact
was that “in the six trials combined, the State employed its
peremptory challenges to strike 41 of the 42 black prospective
jurors that it could have struck.”182 The second critical fact was
that in Flowers’ sixth trial, the one that had resulted in the
conviction under review, “the State exercised peremptory strikes
against five of the six black prospective jurors.”183 The third fact
was that at the sixth trial, “in an apparent effort to find
pretextual reasons to strike black prospective jurors, the State
engaged in dramatically disparate questioning of black and white
prospective jurors.”184 The fourth critical fact, according to
Justice Kavanaugh, was that “the State then struck at least one
black prospective juror, Carolyn Wright, who was similarly
situated to white prospective jurors who were not struck by the
State.”185
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
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183
184
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Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
Id. at 2234–35.
Id. at 2235.
Id.
Id.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
Id. at 2235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the narrow, fact-bound basis
of the Court’s decision, noting: “We need not and do not decide
that any one of those four facts alone would require reversal.” He
stated “. . . all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant facts
and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court
committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory
strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not
‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’”186
Justice Kavanaugh went on: “In reaching that conclusion, we
break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce
Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”187
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent. In its first three sections,
which Justice Gorsuch joined, Justice Thomas went over the
factual record of jury selection for the six trials in detail.188
Noting that the defendant and the victims came from a small
town with connections to many in the jury pool, Justice Thomas
discussed the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons for forty of
the forty-one peremptory challenges that he used against black
prospective jurors.189 Justice Thomas also noted that the one
improper peremptory challenge had been used twenty years
earlier in a trial that did not result in the conviction under
review.190
With respect to the most recent trial and the striking of
Wright, Justice Thomas noted that, shortly after the murders,
Wright was sued by Tardy Furniture, a business that was owned
by one of the victims and later, at the time of the suit against
Wright, by that victim’s son and daughter.191 The store’s suit
against Wright resulted in a garnishment order against her.192
Justice Thomas concluded that Wright’s potential bias was
“obvious,” so that it was not unconstitutional racial
discrimination for the prosecution to strike her.193
Justice Thomas said that the Court should have followed its
normal practice of not granting certiorari to review fact-specific
cases.194 He speculated that the Court might have granted review
“because the case [had] received a fair amount of media

Id.
Id.
See id. at 2252–69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The last section, which Justice
Gorsuch did not join, called for overruling Batson v. Kentucky. See id. at 2269–74.
189 See id. at 2266–69.
190 See id.
191 Id. at 2255.
192 See id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 2254.
186
187
188
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attention.”195 Alternatively, Justice Thomas speculated, the Court
might have taken the case for review because it came “from a state
court in the South.”196 Justice Thomas noted that “[t]hese courts
are ‘familiar objects of the Court’s scorn,’ especially in cases
involving race.”197
This decision illustrates Justice Kavanaugh’s support for civil
rights and willingness to use federal power to hold state
governments to national standards. It also shows his pragmatic,
fact-bound approach to adjudication. On the other hand, Justice
Gorsuch’s willingness to join the portions of Justice Thomas’ dissent
that questioned the factual basis of the Court’s decision illustrates
that Justice Gorsuch is apt to challenge the dominant narrative and
defy Washington, D.C., norms. His opposition is not all that
conservative. Justice Gorsuch did not want to overrule the Batson
precedent and he seems generally supportive of modern civil rights
law. But in a factual dispute over the reach of federal law, Justice
Gorsuch rejected the views of the D.C. establishment and sided with
an object of its scorn.
III. JUSTICE GORSUCH WITH JUSTICE GINSBURG AGAINST JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH
Justice Gorsuch’s skepticism about federal power often put
him on the same side as Justice Ginsburg and opposite Justice
Kavanaugh.198 This section examines four examples—all with a
connecting theme. In each of these cases, Justice Gorsuch
opposed the federal government (or, in one case, a party that was
acting as the U.S. government’s successor in interest) while
Justice Kavanaugh took the side of the federal government (or its
successor in interest).199
A. Biestek v. Berryhill200
In Biestek, Michael Biestek (a former carpenter suffering
from degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression)
applied for social security disability benefits.201 Even though
Biestek was no longer able to perform his customary construction
work, the Social Security Administration opposed his application
on the theory that there were other jobs in the economy he could
perform.202
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See infra, Part III.A–D.
See id.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019).
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
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At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, a
vocational expert hired by the government testified that there
were “240,000 bench assembler jobs and 120,000 sorter jobs”
available to someone with Biestek’s education and disabilities.203
On cross-examination, Biestek’s lawyer asked for the data
supporting that conclusion.204 The Administrative Law Judge
ruled that the supporting data was not necessary and then relied
on the expert’s testimony in her decision, which granted Biestek
disability benefits beginning in May 2013 (when he turned fifty)
but denied prior benefits because of the availability of the other
jobs.205
Biestek filed suit in federal court to recover the denied
benefits, arguing that because the data supporting the expert’s
report had not been disclosed, the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge was not supported by substantial evidence and
therefore should be overturned.206 The district court rejected this
argument, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.207 On review, the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of
six-to-three.208
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kagan and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer, Justice
Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh. The majority opinion reasoned that
the substantial evidence standard is flexible and does not require
“a categorical rule, applying to every case in which a vocational
expert refuses a request for underlying data.”209 Rather, judicial
review of whether an administrative decision was supported by
substantial evidence should be “case-by-case” under a standard
that “takes into account all features of the vocational expert’s
testimony, as well as the rest of the administrative record” and
“defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up
close.”210
The three dissenters were Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Gorsuch. In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch
employed the striking rhetorical device of presenting the case
from the plaintiff’s perspective.211 His opinion began: “Walk for a
moment in Michael Biestek’s shoes. As part of your application
for disability benefits, you’ve proven that you suffer from serious
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1158 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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health problems and can’t return to your old construction job.”
The opinion continued, “Like many cases, yours turns on whether
a significant number of other jobs remain that someone of your
age, education, and experience, and with your physical
limitations, could perform.”212
The opinion by Justice Gorsuch then went on to describe how
the government introduced evidence that there were other jobs
available, and how Biestek asked for the supporting data: “[b]ut
rather than ordering the data produced, the hearing examiner,
herself a Social Security Administration employee, jumps in to
say that won’t be necessary.”213 The narrative concluded then,
“Even without the data, the examiner states in her decision on
your disability claim, the expert’s say-so warrants ‘great weight’
and is more than enough to evidence to deny your application.
Case closed.”214
Justice Gorsuch reviewed precedents under the substantial
evidence standard and then argued: “If clearly mistaken
evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory
evidence aren’t substantial evidence, the evidence here shouldn’t
be either.”215 Not only was the expert’s testimony conclusory,
Justice Gorsuch noted, “for all anyone can tell it may have come
out of a hat—and, thus, may wind up being clearly mistaken,
fake, or speculative evidence too.”216
In his closing, Justice Gorsuch emphasized the values at
stake.217 “The principle that the government must support its
allegations with substantial evidence, not conclusions and secret
evidence, guards against arbitrary executive decision[-]making.
Without it, people like Mr. Biestek are left to the mercy of a
bureaucrat’s caprice.”218
Justice Kavanaugh did not write in this case, but he joined a
majority opinion that saw a dispute between the federal
government and an individual from the perspective of the
government.219 Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, saw the same case
from the perspective of the individual fighting with the
government.220 For the majority, the federal government was
treated as a positive force that should be given substantial

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id.
Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id. at 1162–63.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1152 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1161–63 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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leeway to do its good work.221 For Justice Gorsuch, the federal
government was an arrogant Leviathan that should be subject to
close scrutiny and hemmed in by rules.222 For the majority, the
Social Security Administration hearing examiner was someone
whose discretionary judgment deserved deference.223 Justice
Gorsuch, by contrast, regarded that same discretion as a
“bureaucrat’s caprice.”224
B. Gamble v. United States225
In Gamble, Terance Gamble was pulled over by police officer in
Mobile, Alabama, for driving a car with a damaged headlight.226
Smelling marijuana, the officer searched the car and found not only
marijuana but also a handgun, which Gamble as an ex-convict was
not allowed to possess.227 Gamble pleaded guilty in state court to
drug charges and possessing a gun while a convicted felon in
violation of Alabama law.228 He was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment, all but one year of which was suspended.229
Thinking his state punishment too light, federal authorities indicted
Gamble for possession a gun while an ex-convict in violation of
federal law and Gamble received nearly three more years in
prison.230
Gamble challenged his federal conviction as violative of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides
that “no person may be ‘twice put in jeopardy’ ‘for the same
offence.’”231 The lower courts rejected Gamble’s argument,
following long-standing Supreme Court precedent that violations
of the laws of two different sovereigns are not “the same offence”
within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.232 The
Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of seven-to-two.233
The majority opinion by Justice Alito noted the textual basis
for the dual-sovereignty doctrine, which allows state and federal
prosecution of the same conduct if that conduct separately
violates state and federal law.234 The Fifth Amendment does not
221
222
223
224
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228
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Id. at 1152 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1162–63 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1163.
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
Id. at 1964.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1989 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1963–64 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1964.
Id. at 1960.
Id. at 1963–64.
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prohibit dual prosecutions for the same conduct.235 It prohibits
dual prosecutions for the same “offence.” Justice Alito’s majority
opinion explained: “an ‘offence’ is defined by a law, and each law
is defined by a sovereign. So where there are two sovereigns,
there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”236
The majority opinion went on to argue that the dual-sovereignty
rule was also consistent with the ethos of the founding generation.237
One of the grievances against George III in the Declaration of
Independence was that he used acquittals of British troops in English
courts to bar their prosecution in the colonies.238 Justice Alito noted it
did not make sense that “the same Founders who quite literally
revolted against the use of acquittals abroad to bar criminal
prosecutions here would soon give us an Amendment allowing
foreign acquittals to spare domestic criminals.”239
The majority opinion reviewed the Supreme Court case law
establishing the dual-sovereignty doctrine in the 1840s and then
reaffirming the dual-sovereignty doctrine in numerous later
decisions.240 Justice Alito went on to argue that the old precedents
and treatises that Mr. Gamble cited to support his contrary
position were a “muddle” or “spotty” or “equivocal” and therefore
not enough to establish that the Framers intended to “bar
successive prosecutions under different sovereigns’ laws—much
less do so with enough force to break a chain of precedent linking
dozens of cases over 170 years.”241
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, which said “the
historical record [did] not bear out [his] initial skepticism of the
dual-sovereignty doctrine.”242 The opinion went on to say that
while the case presented “knotty issues about the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment,” it did not appear that the
common law had “coalesced” around the defendant’s
interpretation of double jeopardy right at the time the Fifth
Amendment was ratified.243
The two dissenters were Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Gorsuch. The dissent by Justice Gorsuch began: “A free society
does not allow its government to try the same individual for the
same crime until it’s happy with the result. Unfortunately, the
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Id. at 1965.
Id.
Id. at 1983–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1965–66 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id. at 1969.
Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1987.
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Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule
against double jeopardy.”244
The next paragraph of the dissent started with a quote from a
1959 dissenting opinion by Justice Hugo Black.245 Justice Gorsuch
then stated the same thought in his own words: “Throughout
history, people have worried about the vast disparity of power
between governments and individuals, the capacity of the state to
bring charges repeatedly until it wins the result it wants, and
what little would be left of human liberty if that power remained
unchecked.”246
The dissent by Justice Gorsuch traced the history of the
double jeopardy prohibition, starting with ancient Athens and
the Old Testament and then proceeding through the English
common law to early American precedents,247 and argued that
the term “offence” was and should be understood broadly.248
Justice Gorsuch buttressed this view with common sense, noting
that: “Most any ordinary speaker of English would say that Mr.
Gamble was tried twice for ‘the same offence,’ precisely what the
Fifth Amendment prohibits.”249
Justice Gorsuch went on to argue that early American law
was consistent with this understanding of double jeopardy, the
Supreme Court’s adoption of the dual-sovereignty doctrine was a
mistake, and there was no legitimate reason to perpetuate the
error.250 The dissent noted: “In the era when the separate
sovereigns exception first emerged, the federal criminal code was
new, thin, modest, and restrained. Today, it can make none of
those boasts.”251 According to some estimates, the dissent
observed, “the U.S. Code contains more than 4,500 criminal
statutes, not even counting the hundreds of thousands of federal
regulations that can trigger criminal penalties.”252 Justice
Gorsuch went on: “Still others suggest that ‘[t]here is no one in
the United States over the age of 18 who cannot be indicted for
some federal crime.’”253
In a closing paragraph of his dissent, Justice Gorsuch
returned to his main themes. The paragraph began: “Enforcing
the Constitution always bears its costs. But when the people
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 1996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1997.
Id. at 2008.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
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adopted the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, they thought the
liberties promised there worth the costs. It is not for this Court to
reassess this judgment to make the prosecutor’s job easier.”254
Justice Gorsuch went on to explain the importance of the double
jeopardy rule: “When governments may unleash all their might
in multiple prosecutions against an individual, exhausting
themselves only when those who hold the reins of power are
content with the result, it is ‘the poor and the weak,’ and the
unpopular and controversial, who suffer first . . . .”255
Thus, Justice Kavanaugh joined a majority opinion that took
the side of law enforcement, the federal government, the welfare
of society, and the status quo.256 Justice Gorsuch, by contrast,
resolved ambiguities in favor of liberty and against the federal
government.257 His overriding concern was with the rights of
individuals.258 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch was willing to overturn
170 years of precedent, based on a historical record that even a
sympathetic Justice Thomas saw as inconclusive, in order to
restrain federal power.259 The opinion illustrates the selectivity of
Justice Gorsuch’s originalism. He embraces those parts of the
past that protect individual liberty from an arbitrary or
overzealous federal government. He is not a reactionary, seeking
to restore some actual period in the past. His devotion is to an
ideal.
As a matter of literary style, it is also worth noting that
Justice Alito’s majority opinion referred to the defendant as
“Gamble”260 (which is normal), while Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting
opinion referred to the defendant as “Mr. Gamble,”261 in much the
same way that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in the Biestek case
referred to the plaintiff as “Mr. Biestek.” The addition of the
honorific illustrates Justice Gorsuch’s tendency to show greater
respect for the individual.
C. United States v. Haymond262
In Haymond, Andre Haymond was convicted of possessing
child pornography in violation of federal law.263 The statute
authorized a punishment of zero to ten years in prison, plus
254
255
256
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Id. at 2009.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 163 (1959)).
See id. at 1963 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2000 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1996.
Id.
Id. at 1964.
Id. at 1997.
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2373.
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supervised release for a period of five years to life.264 “Because Mr.
Haymond had no criminal history and was working to help support
his mother who had suffered a stroke, the judge . . . sentenced him
to a prison term of 38 months, followed by 10 years of supervised
release.”265
Haymond served his prison term but ran into problems
during supervised release.266 An unannounced government
search of his computers and cell phone turned up fifty-nine
images of what the government claimed to be child pornography.
Subsequently, the government initiated supervised release
revocation proceedings.267 The district court judge held a hearing
without a jury and found that it was more likely than not that
Haymond had knowingly downloaded thirteen images of child
pornography.268
Normally, revocation of supervised release means that the
district court judge has discretion to resentence the defendant to
a period of imprisonment within the limits of the original
sentencing range.269 But a provision added to the Sentencing
Reform Act in 2003 and amended in 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k),
created a special rule.270 Under § 3583(k), if a defendant “on
supervised release committed one of several enumerated
offenses, including the possession of child pornography, the judge
must impose an additional prison term of at least five years and
up to life without regard to the length of the prison term
authorized for the defendant’s initial crime of conviction.”271
Because of the statutory provision, the federal district court
judge felt bound to sentence Haymond to five more years in
prison, but he added that were it not for § 3583(k), he probably
would have added a prison term “in the range of two years or
less.”272 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that § 3583(k) violated the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases because it mandated
a new and higher statutory minimum based on facts that had not
been proven to a jury.273

264
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267
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 2374.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (using a preponderance of the evidence standard).
Id. at 2375.
See id.
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On review, the Supreme Court ruled for Haymond by a vote
of five-to-four.274 There were three opinions. Justice Gorsuch
wrote a plurality opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan.275 Justice Breyer wrote a solo
concurrence.276 Justice Alito wrote a dissent, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh.277
Justice Gorsuch began the plurality opinion with a
statement of first principles: “Only a jury, acting on proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, may take a person’s liberty. That promise
stands as one of the Constitution’s most vital protections against
arbitrary government.”278 After recounting the background of the
case, the plurality opinion returned to this theme. Quoting the
papers of John Adams, the opinion said: “Together with the right
to vote, those who wrote our Constitution considered the right to
trial by jury ‘the heart and lungs . . .’ of our liberties, without
which ‘the body must die; . . . the government must become
arbitrary.’”279 Justice Gorsuch went on, again relying on the
Adams papers: “Just as the right to vote sought to preserve the
people’s authority over their government’s executive and
legislative functions, the right to a jury trial sought to preserve
the people’s authority over its judicial functions.”280 Justice
Gorsuch then explained that, to secure this goal, “the Framers
adopted the Sixth Amendment’s promise that ‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.’ In the Fifth Amendment, they
added that no one may be deprived of liberty without ‘due process
of law.’”281 He continued, “Together, these pillars of the Bill of
Rights ensure that the government must prove to a jury every
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt, an ancient rule that
has ‘extend[ed] down centuries.’”282
Applying these principles, Justice Gorsuch held that § 3583(k)
was unconstitutional because it mandated a minimum sentence of
five years in prison for Haymond for new misconduct without giving
him the right to a jury trial and without requiring the government
to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.283
Justice Gorsuch rejected the government’s argument that
Id. at 2385–86.
See id. at 2373.
See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 2373 (plurality opinion).
279 Id. at 2375 (quoting Letter from The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym (Jan. 27,
1766), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 164, 169 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977)).
280 Id. (citation omitted).
281 Id. at 2376 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–77 (2000)).
282 Id.
283 See id. at 2373.
274
275
276
277
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revocation of supervised release under § 3583(k) was not a criminal
prosecution within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.284 Citing
precedent, Justice Gorsuch said that “any ‘increase in a defendant’s
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact’ requires
a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt ‘no matter’ what the
government chooses to call the exercise.”285
Justice Breyer’s concurrence indicated that he did not
believe jury trials were normally required for revocation of
supervised release, but that § 3583(k) was an exception because
the statute only applied to a discrete set of criminal offenses, took
away the judge’s discretion to determine whether supervised
release should be revoked, and required a mandatory minimum
of five years in prison.286
Justice Alito’s dissent took mild
issue with Justice Breyer, saying he was wrong but giving him
credit for a narrow opinion that “saved [their] jurisprudence from
the consequences of the plurality opinion . . . .”287 Justice Alito
then trained his heavy artillery on the opinion written by his
fellow Republican appointee: “[The plurality opinion] . . . is not
based on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, is
irreconcilable with precedent, and sports rhetoric with
potentially revolutionary implications. The plurality opinion
appears to have been carefully crafted for the purpose of laying
the groundwork for later decisions of much broader scope.”288
Justice Alito attacked Justice Gorsuch’s sweeping language
about the Sixth Amendment jury trial right because it suggested
that jury trials might be required for all supervised release
revocation proceedings and not just those under § 3583(k).289
Justice Alito warned that this was impractical.290 In 2018,
Justice Alito noted, the “federal district courts completed 1,809
criminal jury trials” and “16,946 revocations of supervised
release.”291 Justice Alito said there was “simply no way that the
federal courts could empanel enough juries to adjudicate all those
[supervised release revocations] . . . .”292
Turning to Justice Gorsuch’s legal analysis, Justice Alito
dismissed his historical support as irrelevant, noting: “John
Adams was not writing about the Sixth Amendment when he
made a diary entry in 1771 or when he wrote to William Pym in
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
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Id. at 2379 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
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1766.”293 Citing the language of the Sixth Amendment and
various precedents, Justice Alito argued that a defendant was
the “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment only
through the initial prosecution.294 After a judgment of conviction,
the defendant became the “convicted,”295 and the “criminal
prosecution” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
was over.296 Justice Alito buttressed his interpretation with
historical practice of parole and probation revocation hearings to
conclude that it was “a clear historical fact” that “American juries
have simply played ‘no role’ in the administration of previously
imposed sentences.”297
Justice Gorsuch responded by taking a broad view of the
policies animating the Sixth Amendment, stating: “The
Constitution seeks to safeguard the people’s control over the
business of judicial punishments by ensuring that any accusation
triggering a new and additional punishment is proven to the
satisfaction of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”298 Justice
Gorsuch criticized the dissent for giving the government too
much power, noting: “If the government and dissent were correct,
Congress could require anyone convicted of even a modest crime
to serve a sentence of supervised release for the rest of his life. At
that point, a judge could try and convict him of any violation of
the terms of his release under a preponderance of the evidence
standard, and then sentence him to pretty much anything.”299
Justice Gorsuch responded to the dissent’s practical
objections with the argument that, “like much else in our
Constitution, the jury system isn’t designed to promote efficiency
but to protect liberty.”300 He went on to quote from William
Blackstone’s Commentaries, an 18th Century treatise on English
law, that threats to the jury trial right would come in the form of
subtle machinations and that no matter how “convenient” these
incursions “may appear at first, (as doubtless all arbitrary
powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let it be again
remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms
of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters.”301
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See id. at 2393.
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Once again, Justice Gorsuch resolved doubts in favor of
liberty and against the federal government. He scoured the
treatises of the past, finding support for his understanding of
their ideals. He favored the rights of individuals over the
supposed welfare of society. Justice Gorsuch sought to protect
people like Andre Haymond from the U.S. government. Justice
Kavanaugh took the opposing view, joining Justice Alito’s
defense of federal power and recognizing the practical needs of
law enforcement. Unlike Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh
sought to protect society from people like Andre Haymond.
D. Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.302
Another illustration of Justice Gorsuch and Justice Ginsburg
taking the same side, with Justice Kavanaugh opposed, is
Washington State Department of Licensing. The State of
Washington taxed the importation of motor fuel through ground
transportation.303 The question before the Supreme Court was
whether an 1855 treaty between the Yakama Nation and the
U.S. Government barred the State from imposing that tax on
Cougar Den, a company owned by a member of the Yakama
Nation and incorporated under Yakama law that trucked motor
fuel over public highways to the Yakama reservation.304
In exchange for ten million acres of Yakama land (a quarter
of what is now the State of Washington), the 1855 treaty gave
members of the Yakama Nation various rights.305 The treaty
promised the Yakamas, inter alia, “the right, in common with
citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public
highways.”306 Cougar Den argued that this meant Yakamas could
import fuel by highway without being subject to state taxes.307
The State of Washington argued that the treaty simply meant
that the State could not discriminate against the Yakamas and
that since the motor fuel importation tax applied to all citizens it
was proper.308
By a vote of five-to-four, the Supreme Court ruled for Cougar
Den.309 The majority coalition consisted of the Court’s four liberal
Justices and Justice Gorsuch. The plurality opinion by Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor, was
careful to limit its scope to protecting the Yakamas from the
302
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305
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308
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Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
Id. at 1006.
Id.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
See id. at 1000.

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/19/2021 1:41 PM

Supreme Court Justices Clash

373

particular tax at issue and not to impugn State power over the
Yakamas in a variety of other circumstances.310
Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, that was far more sweeping in its scope.311 His opinion
began by noting that “[t]he Yakamas have lived in the Pacific
Northwest for centuries,”312 and observed that they gave up ten
million acres of their land in exchange for rights under the 1855
treaty with the United States.313 He described the Court’s task as
the “modest one” of construing the treaty to adopt “the
interpretation most consistent with the treaty’s original
meaning.”314 That meaning, Justice Gorsuch was careful to
emphasize, was not what the government might have
understood, but rather what the treaty meant to the Yakamas.
Quoting precedent, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Supreme
Court “must ‘give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves
would have understood them.’”315 He explained the basis for this
rule: “After all, the United States drew up this contract, and we
normally construe any ambiguities against the drafter who
enjoys the power of the pen.”316
Focusing on the language of the treaty, Justice Gorsuch
acknowledged that “[t]o some modern ears, the right to travel in
common with others might seem merely a right to use the roads
subject to the same taxes and regulations as everyone else.”317
However, he went on to note that the modern understanding of
the words did not matter, because that was “not how the
Yakamas understood the treaty’s terms”318 at the time the 1855
treaty was signed. Citing factual findings from another treaty
case, he explained that “[i]n the Yakama language, the phrase ‘in
common with’ . . . suggest[ed] public use or general use without
restriction.”319
Justice Gorsuch argued that this reading of the treaty also
made the most sense given the huge amount of land that the
Yakamas surrendered pursuant to the deal. He noted that, under
the government’s interpretation, the right to travel promised to
tribal members under the treaty extended only to “the right to
310
311
312
313
314
315
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See id. at 1015 (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.).
Id. at 1016. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196
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venture out of their reservation and use the public highways like
everyone else. But the record shows that the consideration the
Yakamas supplied was worth far more than an abject promise
they would not be made prisoners on their reservation.”320
In his closing summation, Justice Gorsuch put the decision
in a larger context, noting that the case really told “an old and
familiar story.”321 The federal government took millions of acres
of tribal land in exchange for “a handful of modest promises.”322
Now, he observed, the government was dissatisfied with what it
gave up in the deal: “It is a new day, and now it wants more.”323
Justice Gorsuch gave the Supreme Court credit for holding the
government to the terms of its bargain and further opined: “It is
the least we can do.”324
The main dissent was written by Chief Justice Roberts and
joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh.325 Justice
Kavanaugh also wrote a separate dissent in which Justice
Thomas joined.326 In that dissent, Justice Kavanaugh interpreted
the treaty language using a plain, common sense approach,
reasoning that “[t]he treaty’s ‘in common with’ language means
what it says. The treaty recognizes tribal members’ right to
travel on off-reservation public highways on equal terms with
other U.S. citizens.”327 He noted that the Yakamas had reason to
accept this deal because in 1855 the government could have
required the Yakamas to obtain special licenses before travelling
off-reservation.328
Justice Kavanaugh conceded that, under this reading, “the
treaty as negotiated and written may not have turned out to be a
particularly good deal for the Yakamas.”329 But in his view, that
was not a legitimate concern for the Supreme Court because “[a]s
a matter of separation of powers, . . . courts are bound by the text
of the treaty.”330 Besides, Justice Kavanaugh noted, Congress
later did many things to help the Yakamas.331 Therefore, he
concluded, “lament about the terms of the treaty negotiated by
the Federal Government and the Tribe in 1855 does not support

320
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the Judiciary (as opposed to Congress and the President)
rewriting the law in 2019.”332
Once again, Justice Gorsuch leaned to the side of the
individual and the group, while Justice Kavanaugh leaned
toward the federal government. Justice Gorsuch was interested
in what the treaty meant to those subject to federal power, while
Justice Kavanaugh looked at the treaty language from a
perspective sympathetic to the government. Justice Gorsuch
resolved doubts against the federal government, while Justice
Kavanaugh resolved ambiguities in its favor. Justice Gorsuch
saw the federal government as the Yakamas’ exploiter; Justice
Kavanaugh saw it as their benefactor.
IV. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH AND JUSTICE GORSUCH, TOGETHER
To balance this discussion of the differences in judicial
philosophy between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch, it is
informative to examine cases in which the two Justices’ views
were aligned. Indeed, there exist many cases in which Justice
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch are in substantial agreement.333
However, even where the Justices agree in the judgment, their
reasoning often differs greatly.334 Justice Kavanaugh tries to
express his views in a pragmatic, limited, moderate way that the
D.C. community would likely find acceptable. Justice Gorsuch, by
contrast, expresses his opinions in terms perhaps more pleasing
to an intellectually conservative audience.
A. Limiting Federal Power
Justice Kavanaugh often agrees with Justice Gorsuch that
particular applications of federal power are inappropriate. For
example, in Iancu v. Brunetti,335 a six-to-three decision, both
Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch joined an opinion by
Justice Kagan holding that a provision of the Lanham Act
denying trademark status to marks that were “immoral or
scandalous” violated the First Amendment. In Dutra Group
v. Batterton,336 another six-to-three opinion, Justice Kavanaugh
and Justice Gorsuch joined an opinion by Justice Alito holding
that punitive damages were not available on an unseaworthiness
claim brought under federal maritime law. In Rucho v. Common

Id.
See infra, Part IV.A–C.
Compare Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S.Ct. 2067, 2093 (2019)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) with id. at 2103 (Gorsuch, J. concurring).
335 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
336 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019).
332
333
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Cause,337 a five-to-four case, both Justices joined an opinion by
Chief Justice Roberts holding that federal courts should not
attempt to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.
In Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,338 Justice Kavanaugh
joined a plurality opinion by Justice Gorsuch that held that a
Virginia statute that banned the mining of uranium was not
implicitly preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act when the
federal statute deliberately left the regulation of uranium mining
to the States.339 The key reasoning of the opinion was that the
Supreme Court was not free “to extend a federal statute to a
sphere Congress was well aware of but chose to leave alone.”340
Justice Gorsuch went on to explain: “Invoking some brooding
federal interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference should
never be enough to win preemption of a state law; a litigant must
point specifically to ‘a constitutional text or a federal statute’ that
does the displacing or conflicts with state law.”341 Despite his
demonstrated sympathy toward federal power,342 Justice
Kavanaugh joined this rationale in the context of a State law
prohibiting uranium mining.343
B. Abortion and the Death Penalty
The two Justices do not differ significantly on hot-button
social issues, such as abortion and the death penalty. For
example, in Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky,
Inc.,344 the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of a Court of
Appeals decision that struck down an Indiana law prohibiting
abortion clinics from knowingly providing sex-, race-, or
disability-selective abortions.345 Both Justice Kavanaugh and
Justice Gorsuch joined the decision, which was based on the
absence of any disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal
on the issue.346
In June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee,347 the Supreme Court
voted five-to-four to block implementation of a Louisiana statute that
required doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at
nearby hospitals.348 Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Justice
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
Id. at 1900.
Id.
Id. at 1901.
See, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019).
Id. at 1781.
See id. at 1783–93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
139 S. Ct. 663 (2019).
Id.
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Thomas, Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch.349 The dissent, however,
was very narrow.350 Justice Kavanaugh noted that the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upholding the challenged law
had predicted that the doctors who performed abortions would all be
able to obtain the needed admitting privileges.351 The dissent also
noted that the Louisiana law had a “45-day regulatory transition”
period in which the law would not be enforced while the doctors
sought admitting privileges.352 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh
concluded, he would deny the plaintiffs’ request to stay
implementation of the law “without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ ability
to bring a . . . motion for preliminary injunction at the conclusion of
the 45-day regulatory transition period if the Fifth Circuit’s factual
prediction about the doctors’ ability to obtain admitting privileges
proves to be inaccurate.”353
In Bucklew v. Precythe,354 a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court set forth the standard for adjudicating challenges
to a particular mode of execution (e.g. lethal injection) based on
the prisoner’s particular medical condition.355 The majority
opinion by Justice Gorsuch struck a conservative tone, flatly
asserting: “The Constitution allows capital punishment.”356
Justice Kavanaugh added a short concurring opinion that
highlighted the liberal aspects of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion.357
C. Differences in Agreement
Sometimes, the daylight between Justice Kavanaugh and
Justice Gorsuch is evident even when they are in agreement as to
the result. For example, in Kisor v. Wilkie,358 the Veteran’s
Administration denied retroactive disability benefits to a
Vietnam veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
based on the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.359
Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that argued that federal courts
should not defer to agency interpretations of agency regulations,
except to the extent that deference was warranted by genuine
technical expertise.360 Justice Gorsuch reasoned that
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019).
Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1135–36 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
Id. at 2405.
Id. at 2442–43.
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“foundational principles” of constitutional law361 precluded
deference to bureaucrats and required courts to utilize instead
“the traditional tools of interpretation judges have employed for
centuries to elucidate the law’s original public meaning.”362
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a short opinion that concurred with
Justice Gorsuch but used a modern, common sense analogy,
noting: “Umpires in games at Wrigley Field do not defer to the
Cubs manager’s in-game interpretation of Wrigley’s ground
rules.”363
Another good example of how the two Justices’ reasoning can
diverge, even when agreeing as to the result, is American Legion
v. American Humanist Ass’n,364 a seven-to-two decision, that
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Bladensburg
Peace Cross, a 94-year-old memorial raised on public land to
honor World War I casualties.365 Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring
opinion set forth a complex multi-element standard for courts to
use in determining when government practices would
“ordinarily” survive Establishment Clause challenge.366 Justice
Kavanaugh then applied that standard to conclude the war
memorial did not violate the Constitution because it was not
coercive and was rooted in history and tradition.367 He professed
“deep respect for the plaintiffs’ sincere objections to seeing the
cross on public land”368 and further recognized a supporting
amicus group’s “sense of distress and alienation.”369 Rather than
endorse an Establishment Clause action, he instead suggested
other methods by which these groups could secure removal of the
cross.370
In contrast, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion bordered on dismissive.
In concurrence, he wrote: “The American Humanist Association
wants a federal court to order the destruction of a 94-year-old war
memorial because its members are offended.”371 Justice Gorsuch
agreed the memorial was constitutional, but went one step further
in noting that he would dismiss the case for lack of standing
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See id. at 2437–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 2442.
Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
Id. at 2074.
Id. at 2092–93.
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2094.
Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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without reaching the merits.372 He explained: “This ‘offended
observer’ theory of standing has no basis in law.”373
Justice Gorsuch considered the policy implications of the
plaintiffs’ argument: “If individuals and groups could invoke the
authority of a federal court to forbid what they dislike for no
more reason than they dislike it, we would risk exceeding the
judiciary’s limited constitutional mandate and infringing on
powers committed to other branches of government.”374 Justice
Gorsuch went on: “Courts would start to look more like
legislatures, responding to social pressures rather than
remedying concrete harms, in the process supplanting the right
of the people and their elected representatives to govern
themselves.”375
Justice Gorsuch also disagreed with the implication in the
Court’s opinion that the Bladensburg Peace Cross might have
survived constitutional scrutiny only because it was old.376 He
explained that what matters when assessing a monument or
practice “isn’t its age but its compliance with ageless principles. The
Constitution’s meaning is fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only
coupon, and a practice consistent with our nation’s traditions is just
as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.”377
Allowing litigation by offended observers, Justice Gorsuch
argued, courted disaster: “what about the display of the Ten
Commandments on the frieze in our own courtroom or on the
doors leading into it? Or the statutes of Moses and the Apostle
Paul next door in the Library of Congress?”378 It would be better,
Justice Gorsuch said, simply to deny standing to offended
observers so that lower court judges “may dispose of cases like
these on a motion to dismiss rather than enmeshing themselves
for years in intractable disputes sure to generate more heat than
light.”379
Also instructive is Manhattan Community Access
Corporation v. Halleck,380 a five-to-four decision holding that a
private company operating a public access channel was not a
State actor for purposes of federal court regulation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.381 Justice Kavanaugh wrote the
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2099.
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Id. at 2102.
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Id.
139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
Id. at 1926.
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majority opinion, which Justice Gorsuch joined. In the opinion’s
closing section, Justice Kavanaugh discussed the philosophy
behind the decision, but in a way that put distance between
himself and that philosophy.382 Justice Kavanaugh noted: “It is
sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the
individual.”383
Justice Kavanaugh went on to apply that principle in
Halleck, stating: “Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its
traditional boundaries would expand governmental control while
restricting individual liberty and private enterprise. We decline
to do so in this case.”384 Had Justice Gorsuch penned the opinion,
its language would likely have been less diplomatic and far more
emphatic.
V. DISAGREEMENTS IN THE OCTOBER 2019 TERM
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh continued to
disagree in significant ways during the Supreme Court’s October
2019 term (ending in July 2020). Consider the six cases below, in
which the two Justices took opposite sides and one or both
penned opinions.
A. County Of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund385
The Clean Water Act prohibits the “addition” of any
pollutant from a “point source” to “navigable waters” without an
appropriate permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.386
In County of Maui, the Supreme Court considered whether this
permitting requirement applied to pollutants that travelled from
a point source to navigable waters through the medium of ground
water.387 By a six-to-three vote, the Court rejected the alternative
answers of always and never, holding instead that a permit was
required “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is
the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point
source into navigable waters.”388 In an opinion by Justice Breyer,
the Court went on to hold that in making this determination,
courts should consider a variety of factors, such as the distance
between the point source and the navigable waters and the time
it takes the pollutant to travel that distance.389
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Id. at 1934.
Id.
Id.
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
Id. at 1468 (referring to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1476.
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Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion that defended
the Court’s pragmatic, middle ground approach. He noted that a
flexible standard was needed to prevent evasion of the statutory
purpose.390 He further observed that the Court’s opinion
improved the law: “Although the statutory text does not supply a
bright-line test, the Court’s emphasis on time and distance will
help guide application of the statutory standard going
forward.”391
Justice Gorsuch joined a dissenting opinion by Justice
Thomas, which took a formalistic approach. Justice Thomas said
that he “would hold that a permit is required only when a point
source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters.”392
Justice Thomas argued that his approach was true to the
statutory text (in particular, the words “addition,” “from,” and
“to”),393 whereas the majority opinion departed from the text in
favor of “an open-ended inquiry into congressional intent and
practical considerations.”394
This case illustrates the jurisprudential divide between the
two Justices. Justice Kavanaugh prefers pragmatic standards
that give federal courts and agencies reasonable discretion to
balance opposing considerations and reach common sense
solutions to practical problems. By contrast, Justice Gorsuch
prefers formal rules derived from statutory texts that establish
clear rights for private parties and restrict the discretion of
courts and officials.
B. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian395
Over the course of almost a century, Anaconda Copper Mining
Company, a smelting operator in Montana, caused massive
arsenic and lead pollution over a three hundred square mile
area.396 To remedy the pollution, a group of homeowners in
Montana sued Atlantic Richfield (Anaconda’s corporate successor)
in state court under state law, demanding that the company pay to
have their land restored to its original, unpolluted condition.397
Because Atlantic Richfield had been working with the
Environmental Protection Agency for thirty-five years on efforts to
clear up pollution in the area pursuant to the federal Superfund
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Id. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id. at 1479. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 1479–80.
Id. at 1479.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020).
Id. at 1345.
Id.
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statute,398 the company argued that the state courts did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case and that any restoration remedy
required the approval of the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”).399
In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts in which Justice
Kavanaugh joined, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs
could proceed with their state court suit but needed approval of
the EPA for their restoration remedy.400 As a technical matter,
the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs were “potentially
responsible parties” within the meaning of the Superfund statute
and therefore subject to EPA jurisdiction.401 As a practical
matter, the Court said that EPA supervision of private litigation
was needed to facilitate settlements with polluters by protecting
settling parties from third party claims.402
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the
holding that the homeowners needed EPA approval. Citing a
provision of the Superfund law that expressly preserved state law
remedies, Justice Gorsuch argued that everything in the federal law
“seeks to supplement, not supplant, traditional state law remedies
and promote, not prohibit, efforts to restore contaminated land.”403
After arguing that the statutory language about potentially
responsible parties did not support the Court’s conclusion,404 Justice
Gorsuch challenged the policy arguments in Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion. Justice Gorsuch said: “Maybe paternalistic central
planning cannot tolerate parallel state law efforts to restore state
lands. But maybe, too, good government and environmental
protection would be better served if state law remedies proceeded
alongside federal efforts.”405 Having posed the question, Justice
Gorsuch said that Congress made the policy decision when it chose
to preserve state law remedies in general, while specifically
allowing the federal government to seek injunctive relief if private
or state cleanup efforts really do interfere with federal interests.406
Justice Gorsuch concluded: “Atlantic Richfield would have us turn
this system upside down, recasting the statute’s presumption in
favor of cooperative federalism into a presumption of federal
absolutism.”407
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42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
See Atl. Richfield Co., 140 S. Ct. at 1345.
Id. at 1350.
See id. at 1353–54.
See id. at 1354–55.
Id. at 1363 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 1365–66.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
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Once again, Justice Kavanaugh is apt to read statutes as
conferring discretion on federal officials to do what they may
need to do in order to accomplish their missions. Justice Gorsuch
sees those same laws as preserving traditional individual rights
and protecting private citizens from the will of bureaucrats.
C. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP408
A federal statute gives the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office authority to consider challenges to previously issued
patents and, if the agency deems proper, to revoke the challenged
patents.409 The statute further provides that these proceedings
may not be instituted more than a year after suit against the
requesting party for a patent infringement,410 but also provides
that the agency’s decision to institute a proceeding is “final and
nonappealable.”411
In Thryv, Inc., the Patent Office instituted a challenge
proceeding more than a year after the requesting party was sued
for infringement and then went on to rule for the challenger.412
By a seven-to-two vote, the Supreme Court held that Patent
Office’s decision to institute proceedings in apparent violation of
the statutory deadline was not subject to judicial review.413 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to immunize such agency
decisions concerning challenge proceedings in order to achieve
important goals, such as promoting efficiency, avoiding costly
litigation and making patent revocation decisions effective more
quickly.414
Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion by Justice
Ginsburg. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined only by Justice
Sotomayor. In the opening paragraph of his dissent, Justice
Gorsuch made his objections clear: “Today the Court takes a
flawed premise—that the Constitution permits a politically
guided agency to revoke an inventor’s property right in an issued
patent—and bends it further, allowing the agency’s decision to stand
immune from judicial review.”415 The dissent continued: “Most
remarkably, the Court denies judicial review even though the
government now concedes that the patent owner is right and this
entire exercise in property-taking-by-bureaucracy was forbidden by
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140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020).
See 35 U.S.C. § 314.
See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
See Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1370.
See id.
See id. at 1374–75.
Id. at 1378 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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law.”416 Justice Gorsuch argued that the relevant statute did not
require this result, and therefore the Court should not have taken yet
“another step down the road of ceding core judicial powers to agency
officials and leaving the disposition of private rights to bureaucratic
mercy.”417
Justice Gorsuch went on to criticize what he perceived to be the
Court giving unreviewable discretion to the politically-appointed
head of the Patent Office. “No one can doubt that this regime favors
those with political clout, the powerful and the popular. . . . Rather
than securing incentives to invent, the regime creates incentives to
curry favor with officials in Washington.”418 Justice Gorsuch
concluded: “Nothing in the statute commands this result, and
nothing in the Constitution permits it.”419
The Thryv, Inc. dissent provides a telling glimpse of the
rationale underlying Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. He thinks
courts should prevent lawless federal bureaucrats from imposing
upon individuals’ rights. Justice Kavanaugh, by contrast, has a
much more positive view of the federal government and does not
mind when Congress makes agency decisions unreviewable in
order to promote efficiency.
D. Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc.420
In 1991, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, which prohibited (absent emergency or prior
express consent) automated calls to cellphones. In 2015,
Congress amended the statute to permit automated calls (also
known as robocalls) to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the
United States.421 In Barr, an opinion written by Justice
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court held by a vote of six-to-three
that the amended law violated the First Amendment because it
regulated speech on the basis of content.422 The Court went on
(by a vote of seven-to-two) to correct the constitutional infirmity
by eliminating the 2015 amendment and restoring the general
ban on robocalls to cellphones.423 Justice Gorsuch agreed that the
amended law was unconstitutional, but said the proper remedy
was to grant the plaintiffs an injunction against the ban’s
enforcement, rather than to sever the statute.424
416
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418
419
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1389.
140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
See Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2344.
Id. at 2342–44.
See id. at 2363–67 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Barr further demonstrates how the two Justices diverge in
their attitudes toward precedent. Justice Kavanaugh followed
prior decisions holding that the Supreme Court should try to
limit its remedy by striking down only the unconstitutional
portions of a statute and saving as much of the law as possible. 425
Justice Gorsuch preferred to reason from first principles, taking
the position that the Court should simply enjoin enforcement of
an unconstitutional statute, arguing that the Court’s practice of
severing the unconstitutional portions and preserving the rest
amounted to impermissible judicial rewriting of the law.426
Justice Kavanaugh responded to this critique by noting that
Justice Gorsuch’s approach was a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” that
“would disrespect the democratic process, through which the
people’s representatives” expressed their will.427 Justice
Kavanaugh preferred the approach dictated by the Court’s
precedents; to try to salvage as much of the statute as possible
was, he wrote, “constitutional, stable, predictable, and
commonsensical.”428
The two Justices valued the competing interests of the
parties differently. Justice Gorsuch expressed distaste that the
Court would outlaw private speech—namely, robocalls to
cellphones to collect debts owed to the government—when
Congress had expressly made that speech lawful.429 For Justice
Kavanaugh, protecting people from unwanted robocalls was the
top priority: “Justice Gorsuch’s remedy would end up
harming . . . the tens of millions of consumers who would be
bombarded every day with nonstop robocalls notwithstanding
Congress’s clear prohibition of those robocalls.”430 Justice
Gorsuch responded: “Having to tolerate unwanted speech
imposes no cognizable constitutional injury on anyone; it is life
under the First Amendment, which is almost always invoked to
protect speech some would rather not hear.”431
As evidenced in Barr, Justice Kavanaugh prefers to follow
precedent and preserve common sense federal regulations that
protect the community from harm. This case provides yet another
example of how both Justices differ in opinion. Justice Gorsuch
prefers to reason from first principles and protect liberty.
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See id. at 2350–51.
See id. at 2365 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2356 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 2365–66 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2356 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2366–67 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. McGirt v. Oklahoma432
In 1997, Jimcy McGirt, an enrolled member of the Seminole
Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of sexual assaults
on his wife’s four-year old granddaughter and sentenced to 1,000
years plus life in prison.433 In post-conviction proceedings, McGirt
challenged the State’s jurisdiction to prosecute him, and
therefore his resulting conviction, on the ground that his crime
took place on a Creek Reservation and, according to the federal
Major Crimes Act, “[a]ny Indian who commits” certain
enumerated offenses “within Indian country” may only be
prosecuted in federal court.434 The key issue in the case was
whether the land that McGirt claimed to be a Creek
Reservation—an area that had been promised to the Creek
Nation by the federal government in the 1830s435 and spanned
three million acres, including most of the city of Tulsa436—was in
fact still a Creek Reservation or whether the reservation status
had been effectively abolished by Congress in a series of statutes
enacted between 1890 and 1910.437
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of McGirt by a vote of
five-to-four, the majority consisting of Justice Gorsuch plus the
Court’s four Democratic appointees.438 Justice Gorsuch wrote
the opinion for the Court.439 The majority held that, while
Congress had the power to break the federal government’s
promise to the Creeks, Congress had never expressly and
formally done so. Therefore, the land in question remained a
Creek Reservation, even though the State of Oklahoma had
been exercising criminal jurisdiction over the area and treating
the reservation as extinguished for more than one hundred
years.440
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court began: “On the far
end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their
ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation
received assurances that their new lands in the West would be
secure forever.”441 The opinion acknowledged that Congress had
the power to break that promise, but said the repudiation had to
be express, not simply inferred from a pattern of encroachment
432
433
434
435
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437
438
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441

140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459.
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2464, 2466 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2458.
See id.
See id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2459.
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on tribal rights: “So it’s no matter how many other promises to a
tribe the federal government has already broken. If Congress
wishes to break the promise of a reservation, it must say so.”442
The opinion went on to review the language of the federal
statutes regarding the Creeks enacted between 1890 and 1910
and found that none of them, in so many words, abolished the
Creek Reservation.443 In these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch
said, arguments based on contemporaneous understanding of the
laws were irrelevant: “There is no need to consult extratextual
sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear. Nor may
extratextual sources overcome those terms.”444 It was similarly
irrelevant, Justice Gorsuch wrote, that the State of Oklahoma
had, in fact, been exercising criminal jurisdiction over the land in
question for more than a century and that allowing the status
quo to continue would have practical advantages.445 Allowing
State practice to overcome the written law, Justice Gorsuch said,
“would be the rule of the strong, not the rule of law.”446
Justice Gorsuch reiterated that sentiment at the conclusion
of the majority opinion: “If Congress wishes to withdraw its
promises, it must say so. Unlawful acts, performed long enough
and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law.”447
He stated, “To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most
brazen and longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding
wrong and failing those in the right.”448
Justice Kavanaugh, along with Justice Alito and Justice
Thomas, joined the dissent by Chief Justice Roberts. That
opinion began by noting that the majority’s reasoning meant not
only a rediscovered reservation for the Creeks, but also
rediscovered reservations for other tribes in Oklahoma.449 The
dissent observed: “The rediscovered reservations encompass the
entire eastern half of the State—19 million acres that are home
to 1.8 million people, only 10%-15% of whom are Indians.”450
The dissent pointed out the majority opinion would hobble
the State’s ability to prosecute serious crimes in a vast area,
possibly invalidate decades of past convictions, and profoundly
destabilize the governance of eastern Oklahoma.451 The opinion
442
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444
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Id. at 2462.
See id. at 2463–66.
Id. at 2469.
See id. at 2471, 2474.
Id. at 2474.
Id. at 2482.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id.
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went on to say that none of this disruption was warranted. “What
has gone unquestioned for a century remains true today: A huge
portion of Oklahoma is not a Creek Indian reservation. Congress
disestablished any reservation in a series of statutes leading up
to Oklahoma statehood at the turn of the 19th century.”452
Chief Justice Roberts described the relevant Congressional
action as follows:
What Congress actually did here was enact a series of statutes
beginning in 1890 and culminating with Oklahoma statehood that (1)
established a uniform legal system for Indians and non-Indians alike;
(2) dismantled the Creek government; (3) extinguished the Creek
Nation’s title to the lands at issue; and (4) incorporated the Creek
members into a new political community—the State of Oklahoma.
These statutes evince Congress’s intent to terminate the reservation
and create a new State in its place.453

The dissent accused the majority of taking a “blinkered
approach” that considered each statute in isolation and
“nitpick[ed] discrete aspects of Congress’s disestablishment effort
while ignoring the full picture our precedents require us to
honor.”454 That approach was inconsistent, Chief Justice Roberts
said, with the Supreme Court’s numerous reservation
disestablishment precedents that required the Court to consider,
along with the statutory texts, “the contemporaneous
understanding of those Acts and the historical context
surrounding their passage; and the subsequent understanding of
the status of the reservation and the pattern of settlement
there.”455
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts said, the majority was wrong to
focus on statutory text alone. “Every single one of our
disestablishment cases has considered extratextual sources, and in
doing so, none has required the identification of ambiguity in a
particular term. That is because . . . we have expressly held that the
appropriate inquiry does not focus on the statutory text alone.”456
The Chief Justice went on: “there is no ‘magic words’ requirement
for disestablishment.”457 He reasoned: “In this area, ‘we are not free
to say to Congress: “We see what you are driving at, but you have
not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.”’”458
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Id.
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2494.
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2487.
Id. at 2489.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Chief Justice Roberts responded to the majority’s argument
that supposedly drastic consequences do not justify disregarding
the law by pointing out that “when those consequences are
drastic precisely because they depart from how the law has been
applied for more than a century—a settled understanding that
our precedents demand we consider—they are reason to think
the Court may have taken a wrong turn in its analysis.”459
Chief Justice Roberts concluded: “As the Creek, the State of
Oklahoma, the United States, and our judicial predecessors have
long agreed, Congress disestablished any Creek reservation more
than 100 years ago. Oklahoma therefore had jurisdiction to
prosecute McGirt.”460
The McGirt case illustrates how Justice Gorsuch prefers to
reason from first principles rather than precedent, following his
reading of a text to its logical conclusion without regard to
practical consequences, and justifying his formalistic approach as
required by the rule of law. Justice Kavanaugh’s decision to join
the dissent demonstrates that Justice Kavanaugh is less swayed
by statutory texts and more inclined to look to legislative
purpose, follow precedent, and aim for a common sense,
minimally-disruptive result.
F.

Bostock v. Clayton County461
In Bostock, the Supreme Court held by a vote of six-to-three
that discrimination based on sexual orientation or transgender
status constituted discrimination “because of sex” prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.462 The majority opinion by
Justice Gorsuch stated its rationale in its opening paragraph: “An
employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or
transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not
have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a
necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what
Title VII forbids.”463
To justify this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch eschewed
precedents, policy analysis, and popular understandings of what
Title VII meant.464 Instead, he treated the question as a logic
puzzle.465 His opinion posed the hypothetical of an employer with
a male employee and a female employee, both of whom were
459
460
461
462
463
464
465

Id. at 2502.
Id.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
See id. at 1736–37; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
See id. at 1738–42.
See id. at 1750–54.
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attracted to men.466 Suppose the employer were to fire the male
employee for being attracted to men when the employer would
not fire the female employee for being attracted to men.467 As a
matter of common parlance, that would be called discrimination
based on sexual orientation.468 But, as a matter of formal logic, it
would also be discrimination against the male employee because
of his sex, in addition to his sexual orientation, and therefore
prohibited by Title VII. As Justice Gorsuch explained, in
answering his hypothetical: “If the employer fires the male
employee for no reason other than the fact that he is attracted to
men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions
it tolerates in his female colleague.”469
Justice Gorsuch went on to apply this logic to discrimination
against transgender individuals in a hypothetical involving an
employer who fired a transgender person who identified as a
male at birth but who now identified as a female: “If the
employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was
identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes
a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it
tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.”470 He
continued, “Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an
unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge
decision.”471
Justice Gorsuch brushed aside the argument that Congress
was not contemplating discrimination based on sexual orientation
or transgender status when it enacted Title VII.472 He instead
placed value upon the meaning of the words that Congress enacted,
not what they might have been thinking.473 As he put it: “the limits
of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s
demands.”474 Justice Gorsuch went on: “When the express terms of
a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations
suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law,
and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”475
Justice Gorsuch expanded on this idea later in his opinion,
rejecting the argument that given popular attitudes in 1964
Congress could not have really intended to prohibit
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475

Id. at 1741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1741–42.
Id.
Id. at 1741.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
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discrimination against homosexuals.476 He explained that to
refuse to enforce the letter of the law for the benefit of a group of
people who “happened to be unpopular at the time of the law’s
passage, would not only require us to abandon our role as
interpreters of statutes; it would tilt the scales of justice in favor
of the strong or popular and neglect the promise that all persons
are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”477
Justice Gorsuch then invoked the tenets of legal formalism
to justify the Court’s expansive interpretation of Title VII by
stating, “. . .[O]ur role is limited to applying the law’s demands as
faithfully as we can in the cases that come before us. . . . And the
same judicial humility that requires us to refrain from adding to
statutes requires us to refrain from diminishing them.”478
Justice Gorsuch explained that courts are bound to follow
statutory texts whichever way they lead, regardless of what
Congress may have had in mind, noting: “Ours is a society of
written laws. Judges are not free to overlook plain statutory
commands on the strength of nothing more than suppositions
about intentions or guesswork about expectations.”479
Justice Alito wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Thomas,
accusing the majority of writing “legislation” in the guise of a
judicial opinion.480 Justice Alito declared: “A more brazen abuse
of our authority to interpret statutes is hard to recall.”481 He
continued: “The Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails
under a textualist flag, but what it actually represents is . . . the
theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better
reflect the current values of society.”482
Justice Alito went on to criticize the majority’s opinion for
focusing on a literal and logical meaning of the phrase “because of
sex” rather than considering what the words meant to the drafters
and their original audience.483 His dissent said: “Textualists do not
read statutes as if they were messages picked up by a powerful
radio telescope from a distant and utterly unknown civilization.”484
Rather: “Statutes consist of communications between members of a
particular linguistic community, one that existed in a particular
place and at a particular time, and these communications must

476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484

Id. at 1752.
Id. at 1751.
Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1754.
See id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1755–56.
Id. at 1756–67.
Id. at 1767.
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therefore be interpreted as they were understood by that
community at that time.”485 If the Court followed this method of
construing statutes, Justice Alito concluded, “[t]he answer could not
be clearer. In 1964, ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII
would not have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant
discrimination because of sexual orientation, much less gender
identity.”486
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate dissent and saw the
case as presenting the practical, legal process question of
whether the Court should extend Title VII’s prohibition against
sex discrimination to discrimination based on sexual
orientation.487 Starting from the premise that there is a
difference between discrimination based on sex and
discrimination based on sexual orientation.488 Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent began: “Like many cases in this Court, this
case boils down to one fundamental question: Who decides?”489
He opined: “The question here is whether Title VII should be
expanded to prohibit employment discrimination because of
sexual orientation. Under the Constitution’s separation of
powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress
and the President in the legislative process, not to this Court.”490
Justice Kavanaugh made it plain that, if the decision were his,
he would probably vote to amend the law.491 “The policy arguments
for amending Title VII are very weighty. The Court has previously
stated, and I fully agree, that gay and lesbian Americans ‘cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.’”492 But
public policy alone, Justice Kavanaugh said, was not sufficient to
justify a momentous changing of the law by the Court: “Under the
Constitution’s separation of powers, our role as judges is to
interpret and follow the law as written, regardless of whether we
like the result.”493 And interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964
based on the common sense meaning of its words, Justice
Kavanaugh said: “Title VII does not prohibit employment
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”494
Justice Kavanaugh went on to reject the majority’s logical,
literalist interpretation of the statute in favor of a common-sense
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1822–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1824.
Id. at 1822.
Id.
See id. at 1837.
Id. at 1823.
Id.
Id.
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approach.495 According to Justice Kavanaugh, “courts must follow
ordinary meaning, not literal meaning. And courts must adhere
to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the
words in a phrase.”496 Justice Kavanaugh explained: “Citizens
and legislators must be able to ascertain the law by reading the
words of the statute. Both the rule of law and democratic
accountability badly suffer when a court adopts a hidden or
obscure interpretation of the law, and not its ordinary
meaning.”497
In support of common sense interpretation of statutory
words, Justice Kavanaugh cited numerous precedents that, he
said, “exemplify a deeply rooted principle: When there is a divide
between the literal meaning and the ordinary meaning, courts
must follow the ordinary meaning.”498 Similarly, Justice
Kavanaugh noted, the Court’s precedents made it clear that
courts should follow “the ordinary meaning of a phrase, rather
than the meaning of words in the phrase.”499 He recalled: “In the
words of Learned Hand: ‘a sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the
forest for the trees.’ The full body of a text contains implications
that can alter the literal meaning of individual words.’”500 In
other words, Justice Kavanaugh said: “Do not simply split
statutory phrases into their component words, look up each in a
dictionary, and then mechanically put them together again, as
the majority opinion today mistakenly does.”501 Justice
Kavanaugh concluded: “Statutory interpretation 101 instructs
courts to follow ordinary meaning, not literal meaning, and to
adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning
of the words in a phrase.”502
Justice Kavanaugh then applied this standard to the issue at
hand: Does the ordinary meaning of the phrase “‘discriminate
because of sex’” necessarily “encompass discrimination because of
sexual orientation? The answer is plainly no.”503 Rather, in
Justice Kavanaugh’s view: “Both common parlance and common
legal usage treat sex discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination as two distinct categories of discrimination—back
in 1964 and still today.”504

495
496
497
498
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500
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See id. at 1825.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1826.
Id. at 1826–27.
Id. at 1827.
Id.
Id. at 1828.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Kavanaugh observed that many federal statutes
prohibit sex discrimination per se, while many other statutes
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, implying
that Congress saw a distinction between the two.505 “To this day,
Congress has never defined sex discrimination to encompass
sexual orientation discrimination. Instead, when Congress wants
to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in addition to sex
discrimination, Congress explicitly refers to sexual orientation
discrimination.”506 “In short,” Justice Kavanaugh concluded, “an
extensive body of federal law both reflects and reinforces the
widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination
is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.”507
At the close of his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh described the
majority opinion as an act of “judges latching on to a novel form
of living literalism to rewrite ordinary meaning and remake
American law.”508 Taking a more conciliatory tone than Justice
Alito, Justice Kavanaugh went on “to acknowledge the important
victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.”509 “They
have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in
today’s result. Under the Constitution’s separation of powers,
however, I believe that it was Congress’s role, not this Court’s, to
amend Title VII.”510
The Bostock case provides yet another telling glimpse of the
jurisprudential divide between the Justices. Justice Gorsuch
interprets texts formally and literally, without regard to
precedents, practical consequences, or what the drafters may
have intended. He takes pride in following the written law, as he
understands it, to its logical conclusion. Justice Kavanaugh reads
statutes in a practical, common sense way. His goal is to give
legal language the meaning intended by its drafters, understood
by ordinary audiences, and generally accepted by policymakers.
He eschews literalism and logical formalism.
VI. PRAGMATIC INSIDER VERSUS FORMALIST OUTSIDER
In July 2019, Justice Ginsburg described the Supreme Court as
“the most collegial place” she ever worked.511 In that same talk, she
described her “newest colleagues” as “very decent and very smart

Id. at n.66.
Id. at 1829.
Id. at 1830.
Id. at 1836.
Id. at 1837.
Id.
Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Gently Pushes Back at Criticism of the Supreme Court
and Her Fellow Justices, WASH. POST, July 26, 2019, at A2.
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
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individuals.”512 Justice Ginsburg had reasons to be pleased.
Contrary to expectations, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh
provided Justice Ginsburg with key votes in important cases.
It is also noteworthy that (in divided cases) the two
Justices’ support for Justice Ginsburg’s majorities rarely came
together; it was almost always one or the other. 513 That is
because, despite attending the same high school and clerking
together for the same Supreme Court Justice,514 Justice
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch represent two different brands
of conservative judicial philosophy. 515 What is more, their
differences run orthogonal to the familiar fault line between
liberals and conservatives. One Justice is a pragmatic insider,
while the other is a formalist outsider.
A. The Pragmatic Insider
A native of the Washington D.C. area, who returned to the
locale after college and law school at Yale and a one-year judicial
clerkship on the West Coast,516 Justice Kavanaugh seems imbued
with the ideals of his hometown. He sees the U.S. government as
a force for good with a moral obligation to make the world a
better place. He has a positive, insider view of the federal
government and federal power.
A veteran of the George W. Bush White House who has spent
his career in federal service,517 Justice Kavanaugh is sensitive to
the practical needs of the federal government. He tends to resolve
ambiguities in its favor and in favor of facilitating enforcement of
federal law. He sympathizes with those who exercise federal
power as well as those who need its protection. He has much less
concern for those who are subject to federal power and still less
for those who violate federal law.
Justice Kavanaugh is also sensitive to the moral sentiments
of his hometown. When he can go along with those feelings (such
as by holding that a Mississippi prosecutor engaged in racial
Id.
See infra, Part VI.A–B.
Apparently, the two got along well when they clerked together for Justice
Kennedy. In 2017, then-Judge Kavanaugh said of his former co-clerk: “He’s just an easy
guy to get along with. He doesn’t have sharp elbows.” Adam Liptak and Nicholas Fandos,
How Gorsuch the Clerk Met Kennedy the Justice: A Tale of Luck, N.Y. TIMES (March 3,
2017),
htts://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-anthony-kennedysupreme-court.html [http://perma.cc/2ZNW-FDLX].
515 For an informative discussion of the opposing brands, see Margaret H. Lemos,
Book Review, The Politics of Statutory Construction, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2013).
516 See generally CNN Editorial Research, Brett Kavanaugh Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2018/07/16/us/brett-kavanaugh-fast-facts/index.html
[http://perma.cc/T7QG-PE2L] (last updated Mar. 5, 2020, 5:54 PM).
517 Id.
512
513
514
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discrimination),518 he is happy to do so. When he goes against a
significant number of local opinion leaders (such as by rejecting a
constitutional challenge to the Bladensburg Peace Cross),519 he
does so with apologies, expressions of respect for the losing
plaintiffs, and overtures that he might be open to similar claims
in the future. While he may reject particular federal
interventions as unwise, he makes it clear he understands the
moral imperative of federal oversight to ensure human rights
and justice.
Justice Kavanaugh subscribes to the public policy approach
to jurisprudence that is dominant in Washington D.C. and the
legal academy.520 He believes judges make law and sees that
exercise as a pragmatic process for the protection and
improvement of society. He thinks judges should update the law
as needed to advance the policies behind modern statutes and
decisions.521 He believes laws should be construed flexibly based
on practical needs, within the bounds of ordinary, common sense
understanding.522 In his opening remarks at his confirmation
hearing, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[i]n
deciding cases, a judge must always keep in mind what
Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist 83: ‘the rules of legal
interpretation are rules of common sense.’”523
At the same time, Justice Kavanaugh is a careful, prudential
conservative. He worries about the practical consequences of his
decisions far more than he cares about their theoretical
provenance. He is wary of disrupting the status quo. He likes to
follow precedent and stay close to consensus. His writing style,
consistent with these values, is solid, conventional, institutional,
careful, qualified and matter-of-fact.524 His opinions take the tone
of reasonable policy decisions rather than logical arguments.
Justice Kavanaugh is deferential to his colleagues, Congress,
and the Executive Branch. He takes pains to avoid offending the
conservative or liberal establishments. While sympathetic to the
general idea of federal oversight, he is open to arguments that
See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF
SHAPING AMERICAN LAW (2017).
521 For academic support of this approach, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet &
Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 699 (2013).
522 For academic support, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1989).
523 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Reshaping American Jurisprudence in the Trump Era – The
Rise of “Originalist” Judges, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 341, 362 (2019) (some internal quotation
marks omitted).
524 See Greg Johnson, Write-On: Assessing the Legal Writing Style of Brett
Kavanaugh, 44 VER. BAR J. 30, 30 (2018).
518
519
520
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particular expansions of federal power would be impractical,
unwarranted, unnecessary, or unwise.
B. Formalist Outsider
A native of Colorado, whose early experience with the
nation’s capital was the public shaming of his mother,525 Justice
Gorsuch has a wary, outsider view of Washington, D.C. Unlike
those who worry about the federal government’s possible sins of
omission, Justice Gorsuch’s focus is on the federal government’s
sins of commission. In particular, he thinks the federal
bureaucracy should take greater care to stay within the limits of
its authority and respect the traditions and liberties of others.
Justice Gorsuch sympathizes with those on the receiving end
of federal power or otherwise at odds with the federal
government. He cares about those who need protection from
federal authorities. He has much less sympathy for those who
exercise or seek to invoke federal power. The practical
consequence of this approach is a series of votes that do not seem
coherent from a liberal or conservative perspective. In the
October 2018 term, he took the side of armed robbers,526 Apple
Inc.,527 equipment manufacturers,528 the Tennessee state
legislature,529 a Mississippi state prosecutor,530 a former
carpenter seeking federal disability benefits,531 an ex-offender
convicted of illegal possession of a gun,532 a federal criminal
defendant convicted of possession of child pornography,533 and
the Yakama Nation.534 In some ways, Justice Gorsuch may be
likened to a small-town lawyer whose willingness to challenge
the establishment attracts an odd collection of clients.
Justice Gorsuch has an “engaging and readable writing
style”535 that is much more affable than that of his predecessor,
Justice Scalia, and much more folksy than Justice Kavanaugh’s
525 See Heather Elliott, Gorsuch v. The Administrative State, 70 ALA. L. REV. 703, 711
(2019) (describing how Anne Gorsuch Burford was accused of dismantling her agency and
“‘forced to resign after she was cited for contempt of Congress for refusing to turn over
Superfund records’ on the ground of executive privilege” and noting that it “is not hard to
imagine these events shaping the then-teenage Neil Gorsuch’s views of the Executive
Branch”).
526 See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
527 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
528 See Air and Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019).
529 See Tenn. Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
530 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
531 See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019).
532 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
533 See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
534 See Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
535 Hillel Y. Levin, Justice Gorsuch’s Views on Precedent in the Context of Statutory
Interpretation, 70 ALA. L. REV. 687, 701 (2019).
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institutional tone. Consistent with his anti-establishment
attitudes, Justice Gorsuch starts sentences with conjunctions,
writes in the second person, and uses contractions, sentence
fragments, and alliteration.536 At the same time, consistent with
his doctorate from Oxford, Justice Gorsuch employs the tropes of
classical rhetoric, such as syllogism, pathos, hyperbole, and
rhetorical questions.537 He prioritizes logical reasoning over
modern policy analysis.
Justice Gorsuch follows a deontological theory of
jurisprudence that works well for those who wish to restrain
federal power538 but has limited support in the legal academy539
and Washington D.C. A key premise of that theory, in the words
of a recent article by Gillian E. Metzger, is the “highly formalist”
“classical image of law as fixed, determinate, and categorically
distinct from policy.”540
In his recent book, Justice Gorsuch described the formalist
theory more colloquially as the precept that judges “should apply
the Constitution or a congressional statute as it is, not as [they]
think[ ] it should be.”541 This approach is necessary, Justice
Gorsuch explains, because “sticking to the law’s terms is the very
reason we have independent judges: not to favor certain groups
or guarantee particular outcomes, but to ensure that all persons
enjoy the benefit of equal treatment under existing law as
adopted by the people and their representatives.”542 According to
Justice Gorsuch, judges should not exercise political discretion or
look for the fair solution; rather: “Judges aren’t supposed to
compromise principle but reach their decisions through the
consistent application of logical premises to a natural end.”543

See Johnson, supra note 519.
See Christopher Fitzpatrick Cannataro, The New Scalia? An Aristotelian Analysis
of Judge Gorsuch’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 317
(2019).
538 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 410 (1991) (“Formalism . . . embodies a relatively
antigovernmental philosophy.”); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657,
659–60 (2009) (“[E]xalting originalism was part of a deliberate effort by the Reagan
Justice Department to rally Americans against a Federal Judiciary it perceived as
frustrating its conservative political agenda.”).
539 For academic support for this approach, see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick,
The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018). For an
article summarizing opposing scholarship, see Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble
Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018).
540 Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 28.
541 NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 10 (2019).
542 Id.
543 Id. at 133.
536
537
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In practice, for Justice Gorsuch, applying the law as it is
means construing laws using the traditional interpretative tools
that judges have used for centuries.544 He rejects the pragmatic
idea that judges should update laws to fit current needs or
modern sensibilities. This may sound like positivist deference to
the legislature, but it is actually closer to natural law.545 The
traditional interpretative tools Justice Gorsuch prescribes
include a strong presumption that laws embody the basic
precepts of Western Civilization, the traditional common law and
the foundational principles of the American Republic. These are
the originalist ideas he holds most dear. Whenever possible, he
construes laws in accordance with his idealized vision of these
norms.546 This means giving a liberal construction to provisions
of the Bill of Rights that protect liberty (particularly from
intrusion by the federal government) and a narrow construction
to statutes that run contrary to the ideals of the founders.
At the same time, as the Bostock case illustrates, Justice
Gorsuch regards the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and likely some
other modern statutes as well) as establishing new first
principles akin to those recognized by the Bill of Rights. He is
willing to follow the logic of their texts to expand individual
rights or promote equality under the law.
Justice Gorsuch is not a prudential conservative. He does not
mind defying consensus or convention. He does not worry all that
much about the practical consequences of his decisions, being
content to dismiss possible costs as part of the price for liberty
that the Framers of the Constitution believed to be justified or
otherwise outside the purview of the judicial role.547 While happy
to support tradition when it is consistent with his philosophy,
Justice Gorsuch is also happy to follow his principles to overturn
precedent, upset the status quo, challenge the establishment, and
relieve the oppressed.

544 For a good discussion of originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi & Todd W. Shaw,
The Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel Alito, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 507, 529 (2019).
545 See Richard A. Epstein, Our Implied Constitution, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 295
(2017).
546 Interestingly, the seventeenth century English resistance to royal absolutism
followed a similar ideological strategy. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1688 (1994) (“[Sir Edward] Coke
was not a reactionary but a radical conservative, who reached back into the remote past
not only to strike down innovations of the preceding century of accumulating royal power
but also to justify wholly new legal principles.”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient
Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21
LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 439 (2003) (describing Coke as “the seventeenth-century
mythologist of the ‘ancient constitution’”).
547 See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The philosophical differences between Justice Kavanaugh
and Justice Gorsuch have made their collective impact on the
Supreme Court less conservative, less partisan, less predictable,
and more representative of the country than most people
expected when Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court in 2018.
While this turn of events may disappoint some, on balance it is
good news for the Supreme Court as an institution—and good
news for the nation.

